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SOLEDAD ÁLVAREZ-VELASCO (SAV) is a Ph.D. 
candidate affiliated with the “Spatial Politics” 
research group in the Department of Geography at 
King’s College London. Originally from Ecuador, 
since 2007 she has been investigating the relation 
between irregularized transit migration, violence, 
and the capitalist state, particularly in the case of 
the Mexico-U.S. migratory corridor. Her doctoral 
research focuses on the production of Ecuador as a 
zone of transit used by irregularized migrants mov-
ing towards the United States, and how the tensions 
between the politics of mobility and the politics of 
control have provoked multiple spatial and temporal 
transitions that shape the dynamics of that space  
of transit.  In addition to various book chapters pub-
lished in edited volumes (in Spanish), she is the 
author of Frontera sur chiapaneca: el muro humano 
de la violencia: Análisis de la normalización de la 
violencia hacia los migrantes indocumentados en 
tránsito (forthcoming), and co-editor of Entre la  
violencia y la invisibilidad: Un análisis de la situ­
ación de los niños, niñas y adolescentes ecuatoria­
nos no acompañados en el proceso de migración 
hacia Estados Unidos (2012).
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EUROPE / CRISIS: INTRODUCING NEW KEYWORDS  
OF “THE CRISIS” IN AND OF “EUROPE”
It has become utterly banal to speak of “the crisis” in Europe, even as there 
have proliferated invocations of a veritable “crisis of Europe” – a putative crisis 
of the very idea of “Europe.” This project, aimed at formulating New Keywords 
of “the Crisis” in and of “Europe,” was initiated in the immediate aftermath of 
the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris in January 2015, and has been brought 
to a necessarily tentative and only partial “completion” in the aftermath of the 
subsequent massacre in Paris on 13 November 2015. Eerily resembling a kind 
of uncanny pair of book-ends, these spectacles of “terror” and “security” (De 
Genova 2011; 2013a) awkwardly seem to frame what otherwise, during the inter-
vening several months, has been represented as “the migrant crisis,” or “the ref-
ugee crisis,” or more broadly, as a “crisis” of the borders of “Europe.” Of course, 
for several years, the protracted and enduring ramifications of global economic 
“crisis” and the concomitant policies of austerity have already been a kind of fix-
ture of European social and political life. Similarly, the events in Paris are sim-
ply the most recent and most hyper-mediated occasions for a re-intensification 
of the ongoing processes of securitization that have been a persistent (if incon-
stant) mandate of the putative Global War on Terror (De Genova 2010a, 2010c). 
Hence, this collaborative project of collective authorship emerges from an acute 
sense of the necessity of rethinking the conceptual and discursive categories 
that govern borders, migration, and asylum and simultaneously overshadow 
how scholarship and research on these topics commonly come to recapitulate 
both these dominant discourses and re-reify them. 
 As a network of scholars in critical migration and borders studies, we have 
been particularly concerned to defy the intellectual and political ghettoization of 
NICHOLAS DE GENOVA (NDG) <www.nicholas-
degenova.net> is Reader in Urban Geography and 
Director of the Spatial Politics Research Group  
at King’s College London. Originally from the United 
States, he has previously held teaching appoint-
ments at Stanford, Columbia, and Goldsmiths,  
University of London, as well as visiting professor-
ships or research positions at the Universities of 
Warwick, Bern, Amsterdam, and Chicago. He is the 
author of Working the Boundaries: Race, Space,  
and “Illegality” in Mexican Chicago (2005), co- 
author of Latino Crossings: Mexicans, Puerto 
Ricans, and the Politics of Race and Citizenship 
(2003), editor of Racial Transformations: Latinos 
and Asians Remaking the United States (2006), 
and co-editor of The Deportation Regime: Sover­
eignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement 
(2010). He has also edited a new volume, entitled 
The Borders of “Europe”: Autonomy of Migration, 
Tactics of Bordering (under review), showcasing 
recent research by several of the contributors to  
the New Keywords projects, and has co-edited  
(with Can Yildiz) a special thematic journal issue on 
the racialization and criminalization of eastern 
European Roma (“Gypsy”) migrants in the European 
Union (forthcoming in the Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies). He is currently writing a new 
book on The “European” Question: Race, Migration 
and Postcoloniality.
ELENA FONTANARI (EF) is a Ph.D. student in 
Sociology at the University of Milan (Statale). Origi-
nally from Italy, she is currently affiliated as a visit-
ing student with the Institute of European Ethnology 
at Humboldt University in Berlin. Her ethnographic 
research focuses on the tension between the  
mobility practices of migrant subjects engaged in 
migration for asylum and the control mechanisms 
implemented in Europe over the “secondary move-
ments” of asylum-seekers and temporary refugees. 
She is part of the editorial board of the journal 
Etnografia e Ricerca Qualitativa (edited by Il 
Mulino, Bologna). She is a co-founder of the critical 
research network “Escapes” at the University of 
Milan, working with associations, activist groups, 
and institutions on the topic of forced migration. 
She has published in the journals City, PERIPHE­
RIE: Zeitschrift für Politik und Ökonomie in der 
Dritten Welt, and Mondi Migranti. She has worked 
on several projects with NGOs supporting migrants 
and asylum-seekers, namely the KuB in Berlin and 
the Naga Onlus in Milan.
CHARLES HELLER (CH) is a filmmaker and 
researcher whose work has a long-standing focus on 
the politics of migration. Originally from 
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these topics in relation to the ordinarily unquestioned manifold and transversal 
reality of the multiple “crises” that coexist alongside the purported “migration” 
or “refugee crisis” in (and of ) “Europe.” How indeed may the “crises” associated 
with border control and asylum and immigration law enforcement be apprehen-
sible as co-constitutive of what is otherwise so ubiquitously known simply as 
“the crisis” (the economic crisis), as well as the related “crisis” of “Europe” itself 
(the political, juridical, and institutional crisis of the European Union, and par-
ticularly such “European” institutions as the Schengen zone of passport-free 
travel that has reconfigured the borders of “Europe” by sustaining an “inter-
nal” space of [relatively, albeit differentially] free mobility)? Likewise, this crit-
ical angle of vision on “the crisis” in and of “Europe” must be further situated 
within the context of our global historical moment: the recent and ongoing 
proliferation of wars, civil wars, military interventions, and neocolonial occupa-
tions across the planet in which European powers are and have long been pro-
foundly implicated. This perspective illuminates the dire necessity of radically 
unsettling any self-satisfied European discourse on “migration” or “refugees” as 
the de facto human refuse of “crises” constructed to be strictly “external” to the 
presumed safety and stability of “Europe,” erupting always “elsewhere.” In other 
words, starting from the dramatic increase in the numbers of people seeking 
asylum in EU-rope because of the violent convulsions and disruptions of war, 
but also in light of the preemptive unavailability of any other route for migration 
to Europe for the vast majority of the world’s population, what is at stake here is 
a rigorously postcolonial critique of the governmentality of migration and asy-
lum and the misleading opposition between “genuine” or “legitimate” refugees 
and ostensibly“economic” migrants (Garelli and Tazzioli 2013a; Tazzioli 2013; 
2014). These contrivances of the global government of human mobility inter-
sect substantially (and consequentially) with the analytical categories that dis-
cipline academic research and scholarship. Furthermore, and related to these 
intersections surrounding human mobility, this project similarly inquires into 
how these manifold and interconnected “crises” might signal a larger epistemic 
crisis regarding some of the central and defining categories of thought and 
action surrounding the contemporary (postcolonial, post-Cold War, neoliberal) 
constitution of a place called “Europe.”
 The aspiration and intended purpose of these New Keywords is to effec-
tively “hijack” the dominant discourse surrounding and superintending how 
we speak of and think about the conjunctures of “Europe” and “crisis.” Specifi-
cally, we posit our interventions into this contradictory problem space from the 
distinctive critical vantage point enabled by our engagements with the perspec-
tives and experiences of migration and borders. Hence, the primary motivation 
behind our collaborative work has been to engage in the kind of theoretical dia-
logue and debate that aims to interrogate and disentangle the multifarious artic-
ulations of “migration” and “crisis,” highlighting that the so-called “migration 
crisis” in fact supplies a crucial lens for grasping the wider dynamics of “crisis” 
in and of “Europe” and the European border regime (see “Border Regime” in 
Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). 
 Nevertheless, while we seek to problematize the very language of “crisis,” 
Switzerland, he completed a Ph.D. in 2015 in 
Research Architecture at Goldsmiths, University of 
London. He is currently based in Cairo, conducting 
postdoctoral research as part of the “Precarious Tra-
jectories” documentary project based at Gold-
smiths. His writing has appeared in the journals 
Global Media and Communication and Philosophy 
of Photography. Together with Lorenzo Pezzani, 
since 2011, he has been working on Forensic 
Oceanography, a project that critically investigates 
the militarized border regime and the politics of 
migration in the Mediterranean Sea, and 
co-founded the WatchTheMed project. Their collab-
orative work has been published in several edited 
volumes as well as in the journals Cultural Studies, 
Postcolonial Studies, and in the Revue Européenne 
des Migrations Internationales.
YOLANDE JANSEN (YJ) is a Lecturer in social 
and political philosophy and globalisation studies at 
the University of Amsterdam, and a Socrates Pro-
fessor of Humanism in Relation to Religion and 
Secularity at VU University Amsterdam. Originally 
from the Netherlands, she has worked on secular-
ism and minorities in France, European border 
practices, and is now studying the emergence of the 
secularity-religion distinction as a global political 
paradigm, in relation to the political history of  
liberalism and neoliberalism. She is the author of 
Secularism, Assimilation and the Crisis of Multi­
culturalism: French Modernist Legacies(2013), and 
co-editor of The Irregularization of Migration in 
Europe: Detention, Deportation, Drowning (2015). 
She has been a neighborhood volunteer for 
Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland for many years.
IRENE PEANO (IP) is a precarious researcher. She 
currently holds a postdoctoral research position at 
the University of Bologna, where she was previously 
a Marie Curie fellow. Originally from Italy, she 
earned her Ph.D. in anthropology at the University 
of Cambridge, based on a study of bonded sex-labor 
migration between Nigeria and Italy, for which she 
conducted extensive field research in both coun-
tries. Her academic interests include: forms of sub-
jectivity and resistance, especially in connection 
with migration and its governance, and with sexual 
and farm labor; reproductive work and its relation-
ship to global commodity chains, logistics and 
infrastructures, with particular reference to the agri-
food sector; the conceptualization of spaces of con-
tainment, such as zones, camps, ghettoes, and their 
ambivalent relationship to forms of power and disci-
pline; postcolonial formations, particularly in rela-
tion to slavery and indentured servitude, and their 
resurfacing in the present.
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it is imperative to underscore that this collaborative intervention arises also 
amidst the horrific spectacle of migrant and refugee mass deaths that has been 
produced as a consequence of the European border regime. Far from downplay-
ing the frequently tragic dramas of the migrants and refugees who have braved 
the violence of Europe’s extended and expansive borders – and the monumen-
tal fact that 2015 has been the single most deadly year on record for illegalized 
migrants and refugees seeking to cross these borders, especially across the Med-
iterranean Sea – let alone the protracted travails of the hundreds of thousands 
of refugees and migrants repeatedly blocked during their “long march” across 
numerous borders through the Balkans, this project nevertheless emphasizes 
the generalized crisis of the government (and control) of human mobility insti-
gated for the European border regime by autonomous migrant and refugee 
movements that have defied the borders and appropriated the space of Europe. 
[link to Eidomeni video: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x3jcqo2_open-
the-border-22-days-in-eidomeni_shortfilms ]
 The multiplication of borders and border-zones (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013) 
within and around the amorphous “European” space is seen here as a cascade 
of reactive responses put into place by a diverse variety of formations of sover-
eign power. These heterogeneous state formations include the European Union 
(and various subsidiary agencies such as Frontex, the EU’s border policing oper-
ation), as well as particular EU member nation-states, European states that are 
not EU members, as well as the junior partners in the peripheries of “Europe” 
who have been variously sub-contracted to police the borders of EU-rope, such 
as Libya prior to 2011 or Turkey now (albeit with much greater and more com-
plex strategic geo-political and military stakes). Despite their significant differ-
ences and inequalities, all are substantially dedicated to disciplining migratory 
movements that objectively challenge outright the regimes enforcing selective 
access to the “right” of cross-border mobility and the exclusionary criteria of the 
“right” to asylum. In the face of militarized border police brutality, including 
rubber truncheons, stun grenades, and tear gas, as well as razor-wire fences, 
and the ever-present horizon of interdiction, prolonged detention, and deporta-
tion, we are reminded nonetheless of migrant and refugee mobilizations, such 
as the ad-hoc protest march that departed from Budapest’s Keleti train station 
and occupied a six-lane highway heading to Austria, chanting “Freedom!”[link to 
Budapest video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHXzSWF42Cc ] Beyond 
such dramatic and overtly politicized mobilizations, however, migrant struggles 
to appropriate movement and claim space – to enter Europe, claim asylum, and 
move onward to northern countries in the quest for safer and more promising 
places to stay – are visible in any European border zone, from Lampedusa to 
Lesvos, from Melilla to Nicklesdorf, from Ventimiglia to Calais (see “Migrant 
Struggles” in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). [link to Ventimiglia video: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=h_vIxhHbArU ] In the face of the “migration crisis” and 
the “crisis of Europe,”therefore, we are reminded of what Sandro Mezzadra has 
depicted as “the politicality of migration movements” and must begin to con-
template the politics of “the crisis” from the critical standpoint of what he desig-
nates a “Border-Europe,” a “Europe” constituted by the proliferation of borders 
and border struggles (Mezzadra 2016).
FIORENZA PICOZZA (FP) is a Ph.D. candidate 
affiliated with the “Spatial Politics” research group 
in the Department of Geography at King’s College 
London. Her doctoral thesis is provisionally entitled 
“‘Dubliners’ on the Move: The Fragmented Mobility 
of Refugees within Europe’s Geographies of Asy-
lum.”  Originally from Italy, she holds an M.A. in 
Migration and Diaspora Studies from the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS, University of 
London), and a B.A. in Philosophy from the Univer-
sity of Rome – La Sapienza. She has also worked in 
education projects with migrants and refugees in 
Rome.
LISA RIEDNER (LR) is a Ph.D. student in Cultural 
Anthropology at the University of Göttingen. Origi-
nally from Germany, she received her M.A. in 
Anthropological Research at the University of Man-
chester. Her main research interests concern 
attempts at governing EU-internal migration, 
post-liberal racism, and municipal regimes of 
migration and labor. She is part of the Network for 
Critical Border and Migration Studies (kritnet), the 
research laboratory of the same name in Göttingen, 
the editorial board of the journal Movements, and 
the Munich-based initiative Zivilcourage.
LAIA SOTO BERMANT (LSB) is a Visiting 
Researcher at the Nucleo de Estudios Migratorios 
(NEMI) of the Universidad de San Martin (UNSAM) 
in Buenos Aires. She was previously a Lecturer in 
Social Anthropology at the University of Bournemouth 
(2015); a Research Associate in the Department of 
Geography at the University of Loughborough 
(2014); a Postdoctoral Research Associate in Com-
parative Border Studies at Arizona State University 
(2013/2014); and a Postdoctoral Associate at the 
University of Oxford (2012–13). Originally from 
Spain, she received a Ph.D. from the Institute of 
Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University 
of Oxford in 2012. She has conducted fieldwork in 
Spain and Morocco since 2008, and has a long- 
standing interest in the historical and contemporary 
relationship between the northern and southern 
shores of the Mediterranean. She has published in 
Social Anthropology, the Journal of Borderland 
Studies and the Journal of North African Studies 
among others, and is completing a book-length 
manuscript based on her research in Melilla, enti-
tled Beyond the Fence: Anatomy of a Border Enclave.
AILA SPATHOPOULOU (AS) is a Ph.D. student 
affiliated with the “Spatial Politics” research group 
in the Department of Geography at King’s College 
London.  Originally from Greece, she holds an M.A. 
in Cultural Studies from Sabanci University in 
Istanbul, where she lived for five years and 
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 Thus, the collaborative work compiled here operates at a significant distance 
from the current proliferation of discourses about the “migrant” or “refugee cri-
sis,” challenging the taken-for-granted meaning of the term “crisis” by looking 
at the productive dimension that the declaration of a state of “crisis” of “emer-
gency” generates. In the face of the epistemic crisis of both state and other insti-
tutional actors (as well as academics) in taking stock of the heterogeneity of 
practices of migration towards and across “Europe,” we seek here to re-craft 
some of the most commonplace taken-for-granted categories undergirding the 
dominant discourse from the standpoint of a constitutive struggle over mobil-
ity and space. That is to say, these New Keywords respond to the urgency of 
producing a collective counter-discourse about migration and refugee move-
ments and the purported “crisis” that ensues, starting from an epistemologi-
cal destabilizing and theoretical questioning of the very meaning and function 
of certain key concepts and categories, such as “humanitarianism,” “refugee,” 
“migrant,” “mobility,” and so forth. By focusing on the (at least) two-fold “crisis” 
that has dominated the media spectacle and the discourse of the political estab-
lishment – “the (economic) crisis” and “the migrant/refugee crisis” – and by 
refusing the systematic separation of these and other related figures of “crisis,” 
we hope to direct critical scrutiny toward the frameworks and practices of gov-
ernmental intervention enabled and energized by the proliferation of“crisis.” 
Likewise, yet still more importantly, we aim to call attention to the new spaces 
produced by the diverse manifestations of the autonomy and subjectivity of the 
migrants and refugees themselves. The politics of austerity, acutely affecting 
southern European countries in particular, coupled with border enforcement 
strategies that preemptively illegalize mobile people seeking asylum, together 
impact upon both “Europeans” and “non-Europeans” – citizens and migrants 
alike  – and thereby simultaneously re-fortify the “obscene inclusion” (De 
Genova 2013b) of war refugees and other illegalized migrants into the socio-po-
litical fabrics of local “European” economies.
 Reflecting upon and engaging with spatial and political transformations that 
are still underway, however, we are notably confronted with the methodological 
problem of keeping up with the ongoing border struggles and the concomitant 
reconfigurations of the mechanisms of capture and control that are at play in 
governing human mobilities, in the dizzying context of the diverse array of 
recent events in Europe that have directly affected our areas of inquiry. In partic-
ular, we must mention the various closures of EU internal borders in the securi-
tarian aftermaths of both the arrival of large numbers of refugees and migrants 
in the second half of 2015 and the violent events in Paris on 13 November 2015. 
We must likewise note the moral panic erupting over the sexual assaults in 
Cologne/Köln during the 2016 New Year’s Eve festivities, which have authorized 
a new round of debate over the criminalization and prospective deportation of 
“asylum-seekers.” Consequently, ours is necessarily an intrinsically tentative 
and always-incomplete grappling with the immanent task of theorizing the con-
tingencies and irresolution of socio-political conflicts and struggles in which we 
are still immersed. Hence, while these interventions can in no way pretend to 
provide any semblance of an exhaustive account or comprehensive analysis of 
volunteered in several NGOs supporting internally 
displaced refugees and migrants in Turkey. Her cur-
rent doctoral research examines where, when, and 
how “Europe” emerges in the context of the differ-
ent patterns of mobility and border management on 
the Greek-Turkish border across the Aegean Sea, 
through a comparative ethnographic study of three 
Greek islands.
MAURICE STIERL (MS) is Visiting Assistant Pro-
fessor in Comparative Border Studies at the Univer-
sity of California, Davis. Originally from Germany, he 
received his Ph.D. from the Department of Politics 
and International Studies at the University of War-
wick and was an Early Career Fellow at the Institute 
of Advanced Study there. His research focuses on 
migration and border struggles in contemporary 
Europe and North Africa. He has published in the 
journals Globalizations, Movements and Interna­
tional Migration Review, and has articles forthcom-
ing in Citizenship Studies, Antipode, and Global 
Society. He is a co-editor of the journals Citizenship 
Studies and Movements. He is also a member of the 
research and activist collectives WatchTheMed, 
Kritnet, MobLab, and Authority & Political 
Technologies. 
ZAKEERA SUFFEE (ZS) is currently a researcher 
at Statewatch, and is a Ph.D. student affiliated with 
the “Spatial Politics” research group in the Depart-
ment of Geography at King’s College London. Her 
current doctoral research, provisionally titled “Post-
colonial Whitewashing: Constructing the ‘Illegal’ 
and Framing the ‘Ethnic Minority’ in Britain,” is 
focused on the intersections of migration and race. 
Originally from Britain with Mauritian roots, she has 
worked for a number of pan-European charities on 
refugee and migration issues, and is involved in the 
grassroots activist collective Black Dissidents as 
well as NoBorders London.
MARTINA TAZZIOLI (MT) is a postdoctoral 
researcher in the Mediterranean Sociology Labora-
tory (LAMES/ LabexMed) at the University of 
Aix-Marseille. She was previously a postdoctoral fel-
low at the University of Oulu (Finland). Originally 
from Italy, she received a Ph.D. in Politics from 
Goldsmiths, University of London. She is the author 
of Spaces of Governmentality: Autonomous Migra­
tion and the Arab Uprisings (Rowman and Little-
field, 2014), co-author of Tunisia as a 
Revolutionized Space of Migration (Palgrave-Pivot, 
2016), co-editor of Spaces in Migration: Postcards 
of a Revolution (Pavement Press, 2013), and co-ed-
itor of Foucault and the History of Our Present (Pal-
grave, 2015). She is also part of the editorial board 
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the recent political transformations occurring in “Europe,” the keywords that 
we have chosen – “Crisis”; “Migrant Crisis”/ “Refugee Crisis”; Numbers (or, 
The Spectacle of Statistics in the Production of “Crisis”);“Humanitarian Crisis”; 
“Mobility”; and (The Crisis of ) “European Values”   – each of these signal broad 
rubrics that allow us to repeatedly tackle anew, and from somewhat different 
critical angles of vision, the larger over-arching question of the relation between 
(the government of ) migration and (the government of ) the wider multiplicity 
of apparently disparate and divergent formations of “crisis” in Europe today.
 It is perhaps self-evident, but particularly noteworthy, that these texts have 
emerged amidst the still-unfolding and unpredictable repercussions of the 
securitarian and military responses–within Europe and abroad  – by numer-
ous EU authorities and member states to the attacks in Paris of 13 November 
2015, which will continue to have multiple impacts upon human mobility at 
large. These ramifications are particularly consequential for the social and 
political conditions of refugees and migrants, both for those within the space 
of “Europe” as well as for those beyond the borders who may yet seek entry 
to “Europe.” Nonetheless, and very importantly, this is also true for EU-ropean 
citizens  – especially those racialized as “Muslims” or “Roma” or other sup-
posedly “non-white” (“non-European”) “minorities” (De Genova 2010c; De 
Genova and Tazzioli 2015; van Baar 2016b). On the one hand, all migrants 
and refugees may now be newly figured as always-already “suspect” – poten-
tial “terrorists” who have infiltrated Europe alongside the influx of “genu-
ine” refugees. [link to Greece videos: http://www.cbc.ca/beta/news/world/
europe-migrants-greece-macedonia-1.3330040 http://deadstate.org/stranded-
refugees-facing-greek-riot-police-chant-we-are-not-terrorists/] Moreover, Syrian 
refugees and migrants, in particular, who hitherto have widely enjoyed a dis-
tinctly preferential treatment over and against others seeking asylum in Europe, 
have now been abruptly re-fashioned as inherently suspect and thus, special 
candidates for the dubious status of “bogus” refugees, albeit now re-figured as 
potential “secret agents” with the nefarious mission of entering Europe only to 
perpetrate “terrorist” atrocities. On the other hand, the repeated and succes-
sive closures of various internal EU borders have simultaneously accelerated 
the “crisis” of the Schengen area of “free” mobility (long celebrated as a para-
mount achievement of European integration), while nonetheless summoning 
new formations of still more enlarged powers of integrated sovereignty to be 
configured at the EU-ropean scale. Therefore, simultaneous with the “crisis” of 
Schengen, we seem to be witnessing its re-fortification through an aggressive 
push for the unprecedented securitization of the EU’s external borders, specifi-
cally targeting EU citizens.
 The New Keywords of “the Crisis” in and of “Europe” emerged from a work-
shop convened by Nicholas De Genova and Martina Tazzioli at King’s College 
London on 25–26 June 2015. Notably, this is the second iteration of the “New 
Keywords” endeavor, and follows an earlier but related dialogue that culminated 
in the analogous project of collective authorship and collaborative publication, 
coordinated and edited by Nicholas De Genova, Sandro Mezzadra and John 
Pickles, which appeared in print as a Special Thematic Section on “New Key-
of the journal Materialifoucaultiani (www.materiali-
foucaultiani.org).
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words: Migration and Borders” in the journal Cultural Studies (Casas-Cortes 
et al. 2015). Both of these experiments in thinking and writing together stem 
from the meetings of a multi-disciplinary research network on “The ‘European’ 
Question: Postcolonial Perspectives on Migration, Nation, and Race,” initiated 
by Nicholas De Genova and Sandro Mezzadra with migration and borders schol-
ar-activists and activist-scholars from the UK, Italy, France, Spain, the Nether-
lands, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, and the Czech Republic, as well 
as Turkey, Iran, the United States, and Ecuador. 
 Therefore, this interrogation of the conjunctures of “Europe” and “Crisis” is 
also a contribution to reformulating and expanding the purview of what Nich-
olas De Genova (2016) has called “the ‘European’ Question” – contending that 
we must recurrently and unrelentingly ask: What indeed is “Europe”? and Who 
may be counted as “European”? Posited first and foremost from the conjoined 
perspectives of migration and race, the “European” Question demands a per-
sistent attention to the postcolonial dimension of the borders of “Europe” and 
the boundaries of “European”-ness at the core of our analysis. Fundamental not 
only as a vital corrective against the (re-)bordering of would-be critical reflection 
within the academic boundaries of migration and refugee studies but also for 
problematizing the vexed politics of race, national identity, citizenship, migra-
tion and asylum in “Europe” today, the “European” Question has supplied a 
defining framework for debate among the contributors to these New Keywords. 
Extending this interrogation of “Europe” through the critical lens of “crisis”   – 
the multiplicity of invocations of “crisis” in and of “Europe”  – including of 
course the rationale of “economic crisis” as the presumptive authorization of 
austerity and reactionary populist backlash – these interventions around “the 
crisis” therefore emphatically remind us that what is at stake is nothing less 
than the very question of “Europe” itself. Situated, as we are, in discrepant rela-
tions to “Europe” and “European”-ness, we nonetheless seek to seize hold of our 
moment of “crisis” as a moment of opportunity through which it may be possi-
ble to think and act differently in the aspiration to make the place where we live 
into a place where life is worth living, together. 
Martina Tazzioli + Nicholas De Genova
 “CRISIS”
Over recent weeks, months, and indeed, years, there has been an astounding 
proliferation in public discourse of the word “crisis,” particularly in the Euro-
pean context. Most recently, we have seen the repeated invocation of a “refugee 
crisis,” alternately labeled a “migrant crisis.” Similarly, this same phenome-
non has been depicted in terms of a “humanitarian crisis” while nonetheless 
depicted always also as a “crisis of the asylum system” and a “crisis” of Europe’s 
borders, which is to say, a “crisis” of “border control” (simultaneously signaling 
a “crisis” of enforcement and policing and a “crisis” of refugee “protection”), 
and thus, a “crisis of the Schengen zone.” Notably, alarmist reactions to the mul-
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tifarious “crises” relating to the (“unauthorized”) movement of people  – par-
ticularly across and within the EU’s borders – have largely served to justify the 
necessity of new “emergency” policies and the deployment of new means of 
control. Nonetheless, migration is sometimes figured as the necessary “solu-
tion” to what is often depicted as Europe’s “demographic crisis.” Furthermore, 
this particular conjuncture of “crisis” talk (and crisis-mongering) cannot be 
separated from the more pervasive discourse of “the crisis”: “economic crisis,” 
“financial crisis,” “debt crisis,” “crisis of Euro-zone,” “banking crisis” and the 
attendant recourse to a widespread promotion of the notion that “austerity” is 
necessary and inevitable. Within this wider framework of austerity policies, 
moreover, we likewise have become attuned to a more or less permanent “hous-
ing crisis.” Alongside this more narrowly economistic (neoliberal) repertoire of 
“crisis” discourse, therefore, we have been subjected to a parallel invocation of 
a “crisis of European institutions,” associated with the perennial problem of the 
European Union’s “democratic deficit” and thus also a “crisis of democracy,” 
sometimes equated even with a “crisis of the idea of Europe.” As scholars of 
critical migration and refugee studies, we propose that the so-called “crisis” – 
currently mobilized in the face of the horrific effects of the EU-ropean border 
and immigration regime and visa policies by the mass media, politicians, policy 
makers, and other state as well as non-governmental authorities – can provide 
a prism for unpacking and interrogating these numerous interlocking “crises.”
 Notably, it is another “crisis” – a “crisis” of “the Arab world” or “the crisis in 
the Middle East” – which is figured as the source of an inordinate portion of 
the illegalized migrants and refugees entering EU territory through its external 
borders. Syrian nationals fleeing the civil war have been particularly prominent, 
but the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, previously one of the advance 
outposts of the externalized EU migration regime (see “Externalization,” in 
Casas-Cortes et al. 2015), has consequently enabled illegalized migrants from 
across Africa, the Middle East, and beyond to cross the country’s porous fron-
tiers in their quests to access Europe by braving the European border zone in 
the Mediterranean Sea. Libya’s “failed state” thus re-appears now as one of the 
“weak links” in the chain of “European” border control. Thus, the “migration 
crisis” is often discursively and analytically represented as a byproduct of “the 
crisis in the Middle East,” the labeling of which is inseparable from justifica-
tions for renewed military interventions in an amorphous geo-political region 
from Afghanistan to Somalia to Mali (with repercussions even further afield, as 
in Nigeria and Cameroon). 
 Indeed, it would appear that the externalization of “the migration crisis” has 
become a key strategic objective of the EU. Insinuating that the “crisis” itself 
has been, in effect, inflicted upon “Europe,” the highest ranking figures in the 
EU have concurred that it is the proper role of the states in its wider “neighbor-
hood” to solve the “crisis.” Accordingly, under the cloud of this abnegation of 
EU-ropean responsibility, the EU and numerous African states engaged in a 
two-month long tug of war, culminating on 11–12 November 2015 in the summit 
in Valetta, Malta. The Valetta negotiations reiterated a well-worn managerial 
concern “to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displace-
ment,”1 and declared a new “advance” with respect to “returning persons who 
1. European Union, Valetta Conference, Final 
Declaration <http://www.statewatch.org/
news/2015/nov/eu-africa-Valletta-Summit-dec-
laration-final.pdf>
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are not entitled to stay in Europe,”2 a very tired euphemism for the obligatory 
neocolonial collusion of “sending countries” in the deportation of their nation-
als from EU-rope. Despite the proclamations of mutual “interdependence” 
between “Europe” and its African “neighbors,” therefore, Valetta exposed the 
extent to which the ongoing “migrant crisis” has served to authorize anew the 
protracted (post-)colonial struggle over dominance and power. Hence, EU-rope’s 
highest ambition has been to find ways to export its “crisis” to its poorer “neigh-
bors,” and thus has sought to convert its “crisis” into a neoliberal test of post-
colonial “responsibility,” whereby the ostensible legitimacy and sovereignty of 
African nation-states is presumed to derive from dutiful service to the mandates 
of re-fortifying the borders of “Europe.” Nonetheless, despite these rhetorical 
gestures and extortionist power plays, the Valetta Conference appears to have 
produced little substantive action: at present, no African country has any “read-
mission” agreement in force with the EU (Bunyan 2015). 
 Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the attacks of 13 November 2015 in Paris 
and the resultant proclamation of a “state of emergency” in France – although 
virtually all of the alleged culprits in this attack appear to have been EU citi-
zens – multiple European authorities have resorted to calls for the reactivation 
of internal borders within the EU, in an abrupt departure from the Schengen 
agreements, as well as an unprecedented securitization of the Schengen area’s 
external borders. In fact, over the last year, we have repeatedly witnessed the 
alternation of the opening and closure of various EU border-crossing points – 
between Greece and Macedonia, between Croatia and Slovenia, between Italy 
and France, between Sweden and Denmark, among many others – and the tem-
porary suspension of Schengen in the name of “emergencies” associated with 
what has come increasingly to be represented as a twofold “human threat”: a 
bewildering and uncontrollable “mass influx” of refugees escaping war zones, 
and an amorphous “invasion” of migrants or refugees re-figured as potential 
“terrorists.” Furthermore, following the moral panic over sexual assaults during 
the 2016 New Year’s Eve festivities in Köln/Cologne – allegedly perpetrated by 
unruly “North African or Middle Eastern” young men (purportedly including 
“asylum-seekers”) – newly arrived, “culturally alien,” “unassimilated” (and by 
implication, unassimilable) “Muslim”/“Arab” “asylum-seekers” are similarly 
re-figured now as potential “criminals,” and particularly as “sexual predators” 
and “rapists,” prone to dangerous and violent types of “deviancy,” to be rendered 
deportable and expelled. Hence, the “emergency” associated with the uncon-
trolled arrival of migrants and refugees has quickly become not only a matter of 
border enforcement but also mundane policing, and signals an incipient “cri-
sis” of social order.
 Notably, the European “debt crisis” also seems to be deeply intertwined with 
the “migration crisis”: among the countless criticisms of fiscal “irresponsibility” 
leveled against Greece (now more than ever severely debilitated by EU austerity 
policies), for instance, it is crucial to recall the allegation regarding the Greek 
state’s apparent incapacity to “manage” the influx of an estimated three-quar-
ters of a million refugees and migrants who arrived on its shores in 2015 alone, 
leading to threats to suspend Greece’s inclusion in the Schengen zone “unless it 
overhauls its response to the migration crisis.”3
2. http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/nov/
eu-africa-Valletta-Summit-tusk-final-remarks.
pdf
3. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/463dc7a0- 
982b-11e5-9228-87e603d47bdc.
html#axzz3wM7qdqSu
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 The wild proliferation and continuous eruption of the language of “crisis” 
evidently commands some critical scrutiny (cf. Agamben 2013; Béjin and Morin 
1976; Foucault 2007; Klein 2007; Koselleck 2006; Roitman 2013; Shank 2008; 
Starn 1971; Parrochia 2008). First of all, if the term “crisis” is commonly used to 
denote a situation of disruption within a prior situation of stability, and thereby 
associated with imminent danger demanding immediate action, we must rec-
ognize that – regarding illegalized migration into and across Europe – the very 
distinction between (and separation of ) what is ostensibly “stable” and “in cri-
sis” is altogether tenuous, indeed, dubious. Illegalized migration in Europe 
arises as a very predictable and inevitable effect of a migration regime that fore-
closes mobility for the great majority of people from most of the world. The 
illegalized migration regime is geographically heterogeneous and extensive and 
temporally enduring. Furthermore, it operates through the putative “failure” of 
multiple states to prevent the exit or entry of migrants and refugees who have 
been effectively denied any legal right to access these various states’ territories. 
A state of “crisis” with regard to illegalized migration across the EU’s frontiers 
is therefore the norm rather than the exception, and the convulsive but plainly 
routine government of illegalized migration appears to both operate through 
“crisis” and yet to be in a permanent crisis itself. Likewise, the global finan-
cial “crisis” of 2007–08 and its continuing repercussions within the EU and 
the Euro-zone are best understood to be unsettling, destructive, and violent fea-
tures of the normal functioning of capitalism, rather than some unforeseen or 
unfathomable anomaly. As David Harvey demonstrates, “crises are essential to 
the reproduction of capitalism. It is in the course of crises that the instabilities 
of capitalism are confronted, reshaped and re-engineered to create a new ver-
sion of what capitalism is about” (Harvey 2014:ix). Furthermore, the ongoing 
turmoil of war and civil war across multiple regions of the globe, and particu-
larly in the Middle East and Africa, can only be adequately comprehended as 
the very predictable result of colonial and neocolonial occupations and military 
interventions during not only the last several years but rather over the last cen-
tury or more (Gregory 2004). Hence, we can only ask: When was the Middle 
East not “in crisis”? When was Africa not “in crisis”? While we must be wary of 
recapitulating well-worn colonialist and Orientalist tropes attributing violence 
and volatility to these regions, it is imperative to draw attention not to any sup-
posedly inherent proclivity toward violence or incapacity for self-government 
but rather to the contradictory legacies of conflict and the enduring realities of 
social and political fracture that originate with European (and Euro-American) 
imperialism and their deeply destabilizing effects. 
 Hence, it is doubtful whether the “crisis” label can serve to clarify anything, 
and rather more likely that it serves instead to further obfuscate. As Janet Roit-
man (2013:5) cautions, “through the term ‘crisis,’ the singularity of events is 
abstracted by a generic logic, making crisis a term that seems self-explanatory.” 
It is therefore instructive to recall the political uses that “crisis” may be pressed 
to serve. Labeling a complex situation (such as that of the contemporary dynam-
ics of mass migration and refugee movements) as a “crisis” and therefore as 
“exceptional” tends to conceal the violence and permanent exception that are 
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the norm under global capitalism and our global geo-politics, and may serve to 
perpetuate the conditions that have led to the purported “emergency” in the first 
place. Reinhart Koselleck (2006) offers a useful genealogy of the term “crisis,” 
underscoring that the concept originally evokes decision and judgment, helping 
to draw our attention to the new spaces of intervention and government that 
discourses about the (multiple) European “crises” have opened up. Indeed, the 
proclamation of “crisis” consequently serves the ends of particular forms of gov-
ernmental intervention, usually through the deployment of authoritarian mea-
sures: a situation of “crisis,” after all, appears to demand immediate responses 
that cannot afford the more prolonged temporalities of democratic debate and 
deliberative processes, or so we are told. In this regard, Giorgio Agamben (2013) 
has incisively remarked:
The concept ‘crisis’ has indeed become a motto of modern politics, and for a 
long time it has been part of normality in any segment of social life . . . ‘Crisis’ 
in ancient medicine meant a judgement, when the doctor noted at the decisive 
moment whether the sick person would survive or die. The present understand-
ing of crisis, on the other hand, refers to an enduring state. So this uncertainty is 
extended into the future, indef initely. It is exactly the same with the theological 
sense; the Last Judgement was inseparable from the end of time. Today, however, 
judgement is divorced from the idea of resolution and repeatedly postponed. So 
the prospect of a decision is ever less, and an endless process of decision never 
concludes. Today crisis has become an instrument of rule. It serves to legiti-
mize political and economic decisions that in fact dispossess citizens and deprive 
them of any possibility of decision.
As if to illustrate Agamben’s contention, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordina-
tor, Gilles De Kerkove, glibly remarked to the European Parliament’s Civil Lib-
erties Committee in a meeting following the Charlie Hebdo shootings: “Never 
let a serious crisis go to waste.”4 Here we confront the well-worn sensibility that 
has always informed the most reactionary political forces as well as the most 
parasitic forms of disaster capitalism (Klein 2007; Loewenstein 2015; Mirowski 
2013) – that “crisis” always signals “opportunity.” 
 What “crisis”? Whose “crisis”? Who gains, and who loses, from the labeling of 
the present conjuncture as “crisis”? These are the urgent and critical questions 
that we must ask every time we encounter the word “crisis.” If we are skeptical 
of the language of “crisis” in analytical terms and critical of the political con-
sequences that this rhetoric facilitates, we nevertheless certainly cannot deny 
that we have been confronting a period of momentous transformations in and 
around Europe, which is still unfolding rapidly before our eyes, and for which 
we are at pains to provide an account. If the term “crisis” can be of any use, 
then, it is in recalling its etymological meaning, from the Greek krisis (from 
krinein):“to separate, decide, judge, a distinctive force” (Starn 1971:3; cf. Agam-
ben 2015; Koselleck 2006). A crisis, rather than referring to an external and 
objective state of affairs “out there,” would instead point to a moment of deep 
change that challenges our capacity to judge and make sense of it. If there is in 
4. < http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jan/
com-pnr-plans.htm>. This phrase has often 
been attributed to Winston Churchill, but there 
appears to be no firm evidence for this claim. 
More recently, it was popularized by Rahm 
Emmanuel, current Mayor of Chicago and for-
mer White House Chief of Staff for Barack 
Obama. The promiscuous circulation of this 
sensibility among political elites internationally 
would seem to verify that unabashed opportun-
ism regarding “crisis” has emerged as part of 
the political grammar of neoliberalism (see also 
Mirowski 2013).
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fact any use in naming any crisis at all, therefore, it may be first and foremost an 
epistemic crisis – a crisis of knowledge and the categories of knowledge.
 How do we, as scholars of borders and migration, propose to contribute to 
the considerably more expansive collective task of producing a critical “history 
of the present” (Foucault 1984), in a way that would be grounded in our par-
ticular field of inquiry but extend beyond it? How might we, in Sandro Mezza-
dra and Brett Neilson’s terms (2013), use borders and migration as “epistemic 
devices” to interrogate our contemporary historical and sociopolitical conjunc-
ture? Some of the conceptual repertoire that has been developed to critically ana-
lyze borders and migration may be instructive, we propose, for making sense of 
some of the wider socio-spatial recompositions at work in the present historical 
conjuncture. Migration and borders undoubtedly serve as “political seismogra-
phers” of sorts, registering, through their movements in time and space, some 
of the deep transformations affecting the wider historical and geo-political 
scene, in this instance, “Europe” and its vicinity. However, the movements of 
migrants and refugees themselves are not simply “moved” by deeper or greater 
forces, and rather must be understood to constitute subjective and autonomous 
motive forces of social and political change in their own right (see “Subjectivity” 
in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). 
 Furthermore, it is crucial to note that the proliferation of a “crisis” of bor-
ders and migration “in” Europe also involves a kind of spatial proliferation that 
makes it impossible for any of these phenomena to be neatly confined within 
the presumed parameters of “Europe”: we cannot “contain” our analysis within 
“European” (much less, EU-ropean) geo-political boundaries (see “Count-
er-mapping” in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). Indeed, the very borders and bound-
aries attributed to “Europe” are unsettled by the transnational dynamics and 
inter-continental scale of migrant and refugee movements, and therefore by 
the spatial multiplication of socio-political interconnections among and across 
these different but interrelated “crises.” Moreover, the prevailing focus on the 
“problems” that these “crises” cause for and in “Europe,” or on how these “prob-
lems” would appear to have been caused somewhere “outside” of “Europe” or 
on its “margins,” persistently portrays these “troubling” movements as chain 
reactions that originate somewhere “external” to “Europe” (or at least outside 
of its “core”). Affiliated thus to what always seem to be endemically chaotic bor-
derlands or warzones – and only worsened through the opportunism of “smug-
glers” or “corrupt” government officials in these spaces ostensibly marred by 
lawlessness or, at best, a deficit of the “rule of law” – such illegalized migrant 
and refugee mobilities are depicted as moving always through regions that are 
insufficiently policed, finally to end up in “Europe.” Apparently compounding 
lawlessness with still more lawlessness, defying the “rule of law” with their bla-
tant “illegality,” these “irregular” migrants and refugees can apparently only 
corrode the socio-economic, cultural, political, legal “order.” Such imaginings 
and representations of contemporary illegalized migration suggest not only that 
“Europe” is confronted with a “crisis” that originates “elsewhere,” therefore, 
but also that “Europe” is a kind of “victim” of unfathomable conflicts erupting 
elsewhere, derived from the incapacity or incompetence of (postcolonial) “oth-
ers” to adequately govern themselves. By implication, the “unwashed masses” 
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who flee such places similarly can be presumed to be essentially incompetent 
for properly “modern” (“democratic,” self-governing) citizenship (De Genova 
2013b). Likewise, such representations insinuate that “Europe” (with its mul-
tiple contradictory regimes of citizenship, security, and border and migration 
management) is somehow an “innocent” bystander, not implicated in the 
“causes” of these “foreign” conflicts and “crises,” whether in direct and immedi-
ate socio-economic, developmentalist, and (geo-)political senses, or in the more 
complex and mediated historical sense (Walters 2010).
 Thus, critically analyzing the “European” border “crisis” involves repudiat-
ing at the same time the sort of methodological Europeanism (and methodolog-
ical Eurocentrism) that sustains many analyses about migration and borders 
“in” Europe, by refusing to uncritically assume “Europe” (or indeed, EU-rope) 
to be the singular or primary spatial referent of these multiple crises (Garelli 
and Tazzioli 2013b; van Baar 2016a). What is more, from the point of view of 
sheer numbers, the “refugee crisis” has a far greater magnitude in other places, 
particularly in the immediate borderlands of the various conflict zones, and 
thus, represents a far more dire “crisis” for many countries of the so-called 
Global South. Nevertheless, the current transformations have in common the 
distinguishing characteristics of profound spatial upheaval both in Europe and 
beyond, and involve a veritable re-drawing of borders and other spatial bound-
aries (see “Counter-mapping” in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). Again, to make sense 
of what otherwise presents itself as a “crisis” of border control for the various 
sovereign powers implicated in the heterogeneous and externalized superinten-
dence of the European border regime, the primacy of the autonomy and subjec-
tivity of human mobility is paramount.
 Let us briefly examine two illustrative and instructive examples:
 Migration and “the Arab Spring”: The series of Arab uprisings that ensued 
from the catalytic events in Tunisia, which culminated in the fall of the Ben Ali 
regime on14 January 2011, eventually included the fall of regimes in Libya and 
Egypt and situations of severe political unrest in other countries such as Bah-
rain and Yemen, as well as protracted civil wars in Libya and Syria. Not unlike 
the protracted formations of migrant and refugee movements from Afghani-
stan and Iraq, the plight of Syrians fleeing violence since 2012 exemplifies the 
paradigm of migration as a mere “reflection” (or byproduct) of wider global 
geo-political dynamics, since we may perceive these mobilities as “determined” 
by the successive phases of the conflict. However, such an account fundamen-
tally fails to account for the collective movement that these migrants and ref-
ugees constitute, overcoming each and every border that has been erected to 
obstruct their pathways and impede their trajectories, and therefore apprehen-
sible – objectively speaking – as one of the most important instances of mass 
transnational civil disobedience in recent history. Perhaps in hindsight, we may 
one day regard these mass global movements of border defiance as we now 
understand such historical events as the Salt March led by Gandhi or the March 
on Washington led by Martin Luther King. The migration of nearly 30,000 
Tunisians in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Ben Ali regime allows 
us to think further about the articulation between migration and revolutionary 
processes, rather than conceiving of migration as merely a secondary effect of 
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an apparently more primary political process that may be imagined to be strictly 
confined spatially and delimited temporally to an “elsewhere,” ostensibly out-
side of Europe (Garelli et al, 2013; Garelli and Tazzioli 2013a; Tazzioli 2014). 
Tunisians seized the opportunity of the temporary power vacuum in January 
2011 to cross the sea to Italy in broad daylight, often to the sound of songs and 
the beating of drums. By seizing their freedom to move across the borders that 
had been sealed to them through the collaboration between the Ben Ali regime 
and the EU, they indicated that their aspirations to freedom and justice were 
directed not only in opposition to the way their country was governed within, 
but also against the way they were governed by the EU’s violent and discrimina-
tory migration regime from beyond (but also encompassing) Tunisia’s borders 
(Garelli et al, 2013). Once they arrived on Italian territory, Tunisians succeeded 
in evading controls for a time, sending a crisis of control rippling through the 
Schengen zone – with particularly de-stabilizing consequences between Italy 
and France. In the summer of 2011, having arrived in Paris, Tunisian migrants 
occupied a building and posted banners audaciously announcing their own 
spirit of revolutionary generosity toward a Europe wracked by “the crisis”: 
“We’ve come to help you do the same.” Notably, European social movements 
contesting the imposition of austerity policies thereafter resorted to the rep-
ertoire of occupying the central squares of their most important cities, often 
explicitly invoking the inspiration that came from their counterparts during the 
dramatic events of the so-called “Arab Spring.”
 Migration and the EU’s Uneven Geography: The European “debt crisis” and 
the “crisis of the Euro-zone” have been both the product of EU’s uneven geogra-
phy and a catalyst further aggravating this unevenness (Gambarotto and Solari 
2014; Hadjimichalis 2011). As Étienne Balibar (2012) has incisively noted, 
“one part of Europe is transforming another part into an internal post-colony” 
through a process of “zoning” in which “the inequalities of globalization repro-
duce themselves” in the heart of these countries and regions. However, “the 
limits between the zones,” Balibar continues, “are blurry, unpredictable,” con-
tributing to the destabilization of “historical nations”: it is difficult to antici-
pate “between which countries will they pass, or within which country, between 
which regions.” It seems to us impossible to apprehend the current rippling 
effect of the “crisis” of migration and borders without inscribing it as a vola-
tile force co-constituted with these shifting zones, the moving contours of 
which can be partly read through the very mobilities of migrants and refugees. 
Migrants and refugees have crossed the sea or trekked across the Balkans, but 
have consistently sought to move further onward from their ports of arrival or 
border crossings by land in the southern and eastern European “peripheries,” 
and aimed for northern and western countries where they may have better pros-
pects of receiving legal protection and social benefits, as well as finding jobs or 
linking up with already existing migratory networks. Migrants’ movements thus 
register and maneuver among the increasing differentials within EU-ropean 
territory – not only in terms of narrowly economic gaps between standards of 
living, but also with regard to social welfare provision, legal protection, and 
so on – and thus constitute a kind of “rating agency from below”5: migrants 
are not only “voting with their feet” through “strategies of exit” (Hirschman 
5. We are thankful to Eyal Weizman for  
suggesting this phrase.
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1970), but also “rating with their feet,” down-grading or disqualifying countries 
that they deem to be not sufficiently “European” – not fulfilling their ideal of 
“Europe” as an obscure object of desire. However, these aspirations defy the 
Dublin regulations – according to which the first EU member state to regis-
ter an incoming migrant/refugee’s petition for asylum is responsible for pro-
cessing the individual applicants’ claim, and to which the “asylum-seekers” are 
thereafter to be spatially confined. Thus, migrants and refugees’ desires have 
instigated a deep political crisis at the level EU institutions as well as between 
member states, as exemplified by the tense situations at the borders between 
Italy and France (Ventimiglia), between France and the UK (Calais), as well as 
between the numerous countries of Eastern Europe and their more prosperous 
neighbors to the west and north, such as Germany and Sweden. Both in terms 
of the comparative attraction for migrants, and in terms of the lines of conflict 
surrounding the different states’ duties and competencies for border enforce-
ment, an increasing core-periphery dynamic is at work within the space of the 
EU. The pressure being currently exerted on the so-called “frontline states” (the 
member states located at the EU’s southern and eastern borders) further con-
firms that the uneven geography of “Europe” is continuously being reconfig-
ured. Hence, we are observing forms of internal externalization (see Heller and 
Pezanni, in their adjoining contribution to “Near Futures Online”), reminiscent 
of the processes of externalizing migration enforcement and border control to 
various non-EU countries since the beginning of the 2000s (see “Externaliza-
tion” in Casas-Corte et al. 2015). In the process, the increasing role of Frontex 
calls for new EU-level border policing and asylum processing agencies, and the 
more general pressure of states such as France and Germany on member states 
at the “front lines” of the European border regime, demanding greater vigilance 
and dedication to the ceaseless task of controlling human mobility, begins to 
more and more resemble the troikaization of migration control. 
 It is impossible to understand the current rapidly shifting trajectories of 
illegalized migrants and refugees, and the volatile bordering practices that are 
desperately aimed at containing them, short of articulating them within these 
wider socio-economic and political processes. Nevertheless, as these exam-
ples show, migration and borders are deeply enmeshed and participate in the 
wider transversal transformations affecting the meta-“European” region, and 
conversely provide a productive and indispensable perspective from which to 
interrogate them. Through the critical lens of migration and borders, therefore, 
“the crisis” in and of Europe – ramifying across the full spectrum of economy, 
politics, law, and policy – may be revealed in a radically new light.
CH, NDG, MS, ZS, MT, HvB
 “MIGRANT CRISIS” / “REFUGEE CRISIS”
Mass media news coverage has vacillated remarkably between depictions of a 
European “refugee crisis” and the implicitly more derisive label “migrant cri-
sis.” It is a telling fact that literally every BBC News article related to these topics 
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posted is accompanied with a kind of disclaimer: “A note on terminology: The 
BBC uses the term migrant to refer to all people on the move who have yet 
to complete the legal process of claiming asylum. This group includes people 
fleeing war-torn countries such as Syria, who are likely to be granted refugee 
status, as well as people who are seeking jobs and better lives, who governments 
are likely to rule are economic migrants.” In short, in this example and many 
others, the epistemic crisis related to migration and refugee movements is 
deflected and displaced: the vexed question of how most appropriately to char-
acterize people on the move without “authorization” across nation-state borders 
is deferred to a presumed eventual decision on the part of the “proper” govern-
mental authorities, the ostensible “experts,” who purport to manage Europe’s 
border regime by assessing asylum claims and adjudicating the matter of who 
may qualify as a “legitimate” and “credible” refugee (see “Politics of protection” 
in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). Until such a day of reckoning, however, all refu-
gees may be reduced to the presumed status of “mere” migrants. Indeed, in the 
discourse of the “migrant crisis,” it would seem that the term “migrant” in fact 
refers exclusively to “illegal” migrants, and therefore is profoundly implicated in 
the rendering of “migration” as inextricable from a global / postcolonial politics 
of class and race. Here, we are reminded furthermore that the very term “asy-
lum seeker” is always already suggestive of a basic suspicion of all people who 
petition for asylum within a European asylum system that routinely and sys-
tematically disqualifies and rejects the great majority of applicants, and thereby 
ratifies anew the processes by which their mobilities have been illegalized (De 
Genova 2002; 2013b). As the outcome of the exclusionary politics of asylum, 
the current “refugee crisis” is in fact producing an enormous expansion of the 
rejected refugee population in Europe, and thus recomposing their “migrant” / 
(rejected) “refugee” “illegality” in relation to new formations of class and race 
inequalities (see “Migrant labour,” in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). 
 To begin with, it is crucial to highlight the fundamentally misleading and 
unstable character of the opposition of the terms “refugees,” “asylum-seekers,” 
and “migrants.” Unlike “refugee,” for instance, the term “migrant” does not 
strictly correspond to a specific legal status and by implication does the work of 
consigning various people on the move to the nebulous category of presumptive 
“irregularity” or “illegality.” Nonetheless, as suggested above, the more rarefied 
term “refugee” can tend to relinquish any analytical substance to the narrowly 
juridical (and highly exclusionary) determinations of governmental authorities. 
Meanwhile, the term “asylum-seeker” overtly signals the subjection of people 
on the move to the asylum application procedure, but commonly encompasses 
both those who will and will not ultimately be granted the status of “refugee,” 
as well as various intermediary juridical categories of partial recognition and 
provisional (often precarious) “legality.” Yet, “asylum-seeker” in no sense ade-
quately describes the complex historically specific social and political trajecto-
ries of those who find themselves compelled to apply for asylum in the absence 
of any other “legal” routes for mobility and access to Europe.
 Furthermore, migrant subjects who come to be officially recognized as “ref-
ugees” and find themselves in possession of a temporary “legal” status nonethe-
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less experience the precarity that is produced by the EU’s exclusionary politics 
of asylum. Indeed, the contradictory polices of abandonment and control that 
are deployed by governmental authorities (both EU institutions and national 
states) in order to govern asylum are characterized by a profound ambivalence 
that generates various absurd hybrids for those who inhabit “the margins of the 
state” (Das and Poole 2004), who come to resemble “half-citizens” or “illegal 
citizens” (Rigo 2007). Subjected to contradictory legal conditionalities, these 
semi-“legal” migrant/refugee subjects are sometimes trapped in protracted 
conditions of precarious “legality” and legally enforced immobilization, while 
at other times, the uncertainties of their juridical condition compel them to 
move restlessly across state borders under conditions of illegalized mobility 
and irregularized (temporary) residence (Picozza n.d.). For example, some ref-
ugees (originally from sub-Saharan African countries, who had been living and 
working as migrant workers in Libya for years) escaped persecution and civil 
war in Libya in 2011, and upon arrival in Italy, were treated as “asylum-seekers” 
or “temporary refugees” under the North Africa Emergency plan. Then, after 
enduring homelessness and unemployment in Italy, sometimes for more than 
three years, when they decided to abandon their destitution and move on in 
search of better life prospects, crisscrossing Europe, they were abruptly con-
verted into “illegal migrants.” Those who have been registered as “asylum-seek-
ers” or granted tentative “legal” statuses in an EU member state, such as Italy in 
this instance,fall under the EU’s Dublin regulation: hence, when they relocate 
to other EU countries to temporarily live and work “irregularly,” they are re-ille-
galized (reduced to the status of mere “migrants”), and upon apprehension by 
authorities, may be deported back to Italy. A juridical instability and a geograph-
ical hyper-mobility results, which can be understood as an effect of the tensions 
and conflicts between migrant subjects’ attempts to freely move and make their 
lives in Europe, on the one hand, and the efforts of EU and nation-state author-
ities to control and manage these contested mobilities. “Europe” thus emerges 
as a space of competing practices where borders are continually contested, 
negotiated, and re-defined, with the vexed question of asylum figured as a cen-
tral contradiction of the taxonomic power and mechanisms of border control 
and migration “management” (see “Politics of protection” in Casas-Cortes et 
al. 2015). This condition of subjection to the Dublin regulation is in no sense 
unique to this example, however (Brekke, J. and Brochmann 2015; Kasparek 
2015; Picozza n.d.; Schuster 2011a,b), and increasingly reveals how thoroughly 
the EU-ropean asylum system works effectively as a machine for the production 
of migrant “illegality” (De Genova 2013b).
 Germany’s much-celebrated putatively “humanitarian” response to the 
dramatic influx of refugees and migrants, implemented over the summer of 
2015 – effectively opening its borders (albeit very selectively, primarily for peo-
ple from Syria) and notably, partially suspending the Dublin regulation – has 
to be understood as a retroactive adjustment to the fact that migrants and ref-
ugees have been crossing these same borders for at least two years and have 
been living “irregularly” on German territory in ever-increasing numbers. 
Moreover, in Germany as elsewhere, this sort of de facto “amnesty” (masked 
NEW KEYWORDS COLLECTIVE — 18
as a “humanitarian” policy) has been accompanied at the national as well as 
EU levels by the implementation of new restrictive asylum policies for other 
(illegalized) migrants and refugees. With the summary designation of various 
states as “safe third countries,” for instance, a policy of relative “welcome” for 
some has allowed for the preemptive exclusion of other refugees based only 
on their national origins, as well as the prospective deportation of many more 
refugees who have been petitioning for asylum in EU-rope for several years.6 
Such national-level measures must be seen alongside the new forms of EU-level 
border control and migration management, such as the proposals for a new sys-
tem of asylum-seeker allocation and distribution among member states – the 
so-called “quota system” – which would impose new forms of coerced mobility 
as well as forms of forced immobilization, analogous to those long instituted 
through the Dublin regulation, for migrant subjects. 
 Indeed, over the course of 2015, European responses to the arrival of people 
in search of asylum has been increasingly characterized by a politics of contain-
ment, aiming to block migrants and refugees prior to entering the territory of 
EU member states, at the “pre-frontiers” of “Europe.” The bilateral agreements 
signed by the European Union with Turkey at the end of 2015, as well as the 
EU military operation European Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNavFor-Med) 
to “fight migrant smugglers,” have resulted in increasing numbers of refugees 
and migrants halted in Turkey or Libya. Yet, the politics of containment has 
been enforced within the “European” space as well: with the creation of new 
detention camps – the so-called “hotspots” – points of entry such as Greece and 
Italy have been transformed into spaces of detention, sorting, and deportation, 
where the crude criteria of nationality has commonly become the main distinc-
tion utilized for partitioning those who are permitted to enter EU-rope to seek 
asylum and those who are blocked or illegalized (see “Differential inclusion/ 
exclusion” in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). Thus, an expedited asylum procedure 
is meant to also serve the ends of expedited deportations for all those who are 
disqualified.
 As a new and ambiguous form of detention center, “hotspot” emerges as 
the name for a new strategy for the capture of migrant mobilities: they recon-
figure the demarcation of borderzones at the external frontiers of EU-rope (and 
also within the “European” space) that trace exclusionary partitions among 
migrants and refugees, giving some a pass as “legitimate” while illegalizing 
others as “unworthy” of asylum. The “hotspot” system, first launched in May 
2015 and officially implemented in September in Italy and Greece, represents 
the restructuring of mechanisms of capture and identification in response to 
the migration “turmoil” at the external frontiers of Europe. According to these 
“hotspot” logics, Greece and Italy should operate as border zones for the enact-
ment of a sort of pre-selection process, identifying and fingerprinting as quickly 
as possible all new arrivals and partitioning them as either “genuine” prospec-
tive refugees and all others, who promptly become deportable. Lampedusa and 
Lesvos will hereby function increasingly as island prisons, where the suppos-
edly accelerated temporality of fast identification procedures – conducted “on 
the spot” – is combined with an indefinite detention (and protracted immo-
6. Germany, for instance, has designated most 
of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, 
as well as Albania, to be “safe third countries,” 
even while several human rights organizations 
have collected evidence that many of these 
states cannot be considered to be “safe” for 
Roma. This recent German decision has 
impacted not only on former Yugoslavian citi-
zens who fled to Germany in the 1990s to claim 
asylum under highly disputed circumstances 
(many of whom have recently been deported to 
their putative “countries of origin”), but also for 
asylum-seekers who have tried to enter Ger-
many much more recently from the same pur-
portedly “safe” southeastern European countries 
(Sardelić 2015; van Baar 2016c).
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bilization) for any migrants or refugees who refuse to be fingerprinted.[link 
to Lesvos video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LDOAYSjmDPc; https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=1GZVF1dUbmk ] In December 2015, 250 Eritrean 
refugees organized a protest on Lampedusa, demanding to be released from 
the camp where they had been detained for two months for refusing to give 
their fingerprints.[link to Lampedusa video to be shared via WeTransfer] Thus, 
centers of first “reception” in EU-rope become spatial traps for migrants. Like-
wise, the so-called “military-humanitarian” modes of border government are 
transformed into a police function, performed by EU-ropean actors (such as 
the border enforcement agency, Frontex) alongside humanitarian ones (such as 
UNHCR). 
 These new forms of bordering only exacerbate the uneven geographies of 
“Europe,” however. For example, on the Greek islands of Lesvos and Samos, 
local governments have largely acquiesced and accepted the transformation 
of their islands into “hotspots,” welcoming the arrival of assorted humanitar-
ian agencies such as UNHCR, the Red Cross, and Doctors without Borders. 
In striking contrast, the local governments of other prospective Greek island 
“hotspots,” such as Kos and the small island of Agathonisi (near Leros), have 
persistently refused the implementation of “hotspot” camps and the installa-
tion of humanitarian NGOs, claiming that both the border policing and human-
itarian functions will merely convert these islands into magnets attracting the 
arrival of more migrants and refugees on their shores and, consequently, dam-
age the local tourism-driven economies. Hence, in the context of the economic 
“crisis,” authorities and many other local interests on these islands perceive the 
EU-ropeanization of their management of the “migration” and “refugee crisis” 
as simply another manifestation of a larger “European threat” that has devas-
tated Greece’s economic viability, more generally. From the standpoint of some 
of EU-rope’s beleaguered borderlands, therefore, the deepening integration of 
military tactics and humanitarian techniques reappears not as a “solution” to 
the “crisis” of the border but rather as one more series of measures that will 
further escalate the (double) “crisis.” 
 Furthermore, transit zones such as the Eidomeni camp at the Greek-Mace-
donian border – where the deeply consequential partition between “refugees” 
and “everyone else” is made on the crude basis of nationality (such that only 
Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans are allowed to cross) – or the makeshift self-orga-
nized refugee/migrant camp at Calais near the entrance to the Channel Tun-
nel leading into Britain – where many migrants are periodically apprehended 
and deported by French authorities – operate informally as de facto “hotspots.” 
Reacting to the practices of mobility and the spaces of transit instigated by 
migrant subjects, these official and informal “hotspots” are simply among the 
most prominent signs of the new compulsion for EU and nation-state institu-
tions to re-organize their responses to the autonomy and subjectivity of migra-
tion, in a feckless effort to sort, rank, and manage these human mobilities – all 
the while callously eroding any presumed “right” to asylum, and re-instituting 
the larger mechanisms for the preemptive illegalization of cross-border mobil-
ity on the part of the majority of humankind.
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 The multiplication of borders and the heterogeneity of border zones (Mezza-
dra and Neilson 2013) have been the hallmark of the ongoing “crisis” of migra-
tion in Europe. The perfunctory and euphemistic expression “mixed migration 
flows” is increasingly used by policy makers to reflect the veritable impossi-
bility for states and migration agencies to fully domesticate and discipline the 
unruly practices of mobility that constantly exceed the boundaries of existing 
governmental categories and criteria for partitioning distinct formations of 
human mobility. What is commonly called “the migrant crisis” or “the refu-
gee crisis” actually reflects the frantic attempt by the EU and European nation-
states to control, contain, and govern people’s (“unauthorized”) transnational 
and inter-continental movements. Indeed, the naming of this “crisis” as such 
appears to be precisely a device for the authorization of exceptional or “emer-
gency” governmental measures – and then their normalization – toward the 
ends of enhanced and expanded border enforcement and immigration policing. 
It could be said, then, that the “crisis” itself operates as a critical moment that 
allows governments to push through controversial policies while citizens are 
too intellectually distracted, emotionally manipulated, or otherwise paralyzed 
by the border spectacle to organize any adequate or consequential form of resis-
tance (De Genova 2002; 2013b; see also “Border Spectacle” in Casas-Cortes et 
al. 2015; cf. Klein 2007). The ongoing “crisis” therefore corresponds above all to 
a crisis of sovereignty and the exercise of a power over classifying, naming and 
partitioning the “migrants”/ “refugees.” 
 Notably, the very terms “migrant crisis” and “refugee crisis” tend to personal-
ize “crisis” and relocate “crisis” in the body and person of the figurative migrant/
refugee, as if s/he is the carrier of a disease called “crisis,” and thus carries the 
contagion of “crisis” wherever s/he may go. Most importantly, the figure of the 
migrant/refugee hereby threatens “Europe” with its incurable and contagious 
malady. Whether this figure of personified “crisis” appears in the Mediterra-
nean or Aegean Seas, or at the barbed-wire barricades on land – from Calais to 
Ceuta to the small border towns of Hungary or Bulgaria – the illegalized migrant 
or refugee’s physical presence and transgressive mobility delivers “crisis” to the 
amorphous symbolic membrane surrounding amoeba-like “Europe,” whenever 
and wherever it is “violated” by “foreign” bodies. Some of these embodiments 
of “crisis” are literally converted into figures of death as the corpses of migrants 
and refugees become spectacularly visible through the proliferation of images 
of dead bodies floating in the sea or washing upon the shores of “Europe”; oth-
ers are hunted, wounded, exhausted, covered in dust and mud, or depicted in 
frenzied crowds, charging fences or climbing through the windows of trains – 
like cockroaches, commonly likened to a menacing “invasion” or catastrophic 
“floods,” if not outright “infestations” or “swarms”: wherever they are heading, 
they appear to bring “the crisis” with them. These spectacles sterilize Europe 
and divorce it from its “umbilical connection” (Hall 2008) to the diverse regions 
from which illegalized migrants and refugees come, and thus systematically 
dissimulates Europe’s precisely (post-)colonial interest in the natural resources 
and human labor of these (usually) formerly colonized lands. Migration thus 
presents itself as a disruptive manifestation of the postcolonial heritage of 
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Europe (De Genova 2010c;2016). The  terms  “migrant” or “refugee crisis” 
therefore seem to be aimed at compelling us to imagine a “crisis” embodied 
in the human beings who, through their illegalized mobilities, now come to 
be racialized as “migrant.” In this context, the migrant struggle slogan, We are 
here, because you were there! continues to afford a resounding understanding 
of this phenomenon called “crisis” inasmuch as it invites us – indeed, requires 
us – to recognize Europe’s role in the very production of this “crisis.”
 However, it remains crucial to underscore that the current “crisis” of bor-
der control and migration “management” is instigated, first and foremost, by 
the sheer autonomy and subjectivity of human mobility itself, and arises as an 
effect of the multifarious and entangled reasons for which people move across 
state borders without “authorization” or, alternately, find themselves stranded 
en route, stuck someplace along the way in their migratory trajectories. In this 
regard, in the face of the proliferation of alternating and seemingly interchange-
able discourses of “migrant” or “refugee crisis,” the primary question that must 
be asked is: Whose “crisis”? In fact, this is fundamentally a “crisis” of (postcolo-
nial) state power over the transnational human mobility of those whose move-
ments are otherwise presumptively disqualified as “illegal” (effectively, on the 
grounds of global class, race, or nationality inequalities). Thus, we may begin to 
appreciate that this “crisis” is really a moment of governmental impasse that is 
being mobilized and strategically deployed for the reconfiguration of tactics and 
techniques of border policing.
 This “crisis” therefore must also be seized as an opportunity for re-thinking 
and re-inventing border struggles toward the ends of reinforcing and enhancing 
the elementary human freedom of movement (De Genova 2010b). In particu-
lar, it is crucial to call attention to the new spaces of “transit” opened up by the 
migrants and refugees themselves, and consequently the ways in which these 
“irregular” human mobilities have scrambled and re-shuffled the social and 
political geography of “Europe.” Furthermore, we must begin to recognize and 
theorize the convoluted (un-mapped and potentially un-mappable) migratory 
routes that correspond to migrant and refugee movements across the European 
space that do not abide by the unidirectional (Eurocentric) arrows of the hege-
monic cartographic representations of “the crisis” propagated by Frontex or the 
IOM (see “Counter-Mapping” in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). In this respect, the 
“crisis” of the European border regime provoked by the myriad autonomies and 
subjectivities of human mobilities presents us with a moment replete not only 
with as-yet unresolved conflicts but also unimagined potentialities.
NDG, EF, FP, LSB, AS, MS, MT, HvB, CY
NUMBERS (OR, THE SPECTACLE OF STATISTICS  
IN THE PRODUCTION OF “CRISIS”)
A significant practice deployed to instill a sense of “crisis” with regard to con-
temporary movements of people into “Europe” is the constant circulation of 
accounts of dramatically rising numbers of recent migrant and refugee arrivals. 
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In short, there is a politics of numbers that is crucial for any critical migration 
and borders scholarship or activism to expose. This numbers game, exploited 
by national governments, EU institutions, and international organizations, as 
well as fear-mongering news media and right-wing populist political parties, 
routinely serve to fortify the more general staging of a spectacle of “invasion” 
or “inundation” conjured by images of seemingly desperate “foreign” (oriental-
ized) masses seeking entry to places where they ostensibly do not belong, have 
no legitimate claim, and are presumably unwelcome. The Mediterranean Sea 
in particular has long been a space for the staging of continuous “border spec-
tacles” (De Genova 2002; 2013b) where migrant vessels arriving on European 
shores evoke phantasmatic imaginaries of “siege.” Alongside this proliferation 
of images and discourse, an incessant circulation of numbers thus plays a cru-
cial role in the production of a “crisis” of migration and borders. 
 The strategic use of statistics generates the homogenized and aggregate rep-
resentations that are decisive for erasing the individuality and political subjec-
tivity of people on the move as well as effacing their collective struggles and 
hardships, and thus for portraying “unauthorized” border crossers as a menace. 
Some political collectives, such as United, have offered counter-counts, empha-
sizing the urgency of circulating data and other information with respect to 
those who have lost their lives braving European borders, but whose tragedies 
have largely gone uncounted by state authorities and border policing agencies 
such as Frontex. Here, we seek instead to interrogate how the discourse and 
sense of “crisis” is produced through the politics of counting, or, what we will 
call the spectacle of statistics.
 Notably, the imaginary and rhetorics of migrant “invasion” seem reserved 
for the countries of the so-called Global North – the EU, the United States, and 
Australia, in particular. However, the statistical graphs and maps representing 
numerical data quantifying the supposed “mass influx” of migrants or refugees 
into the sacrosanct space of “Europe” – themselves echoed by the wave shape 
that high and low points of interceptions predictably produce in graphs   – con-
ceal as much as they reveal. In the first place, by focusing exclusively on the 
movement of people across the frontiers of the EU, they by definition leave out 
the reality that countries neighboring conflict zones have borne the inordinate 
burden of providing safe haven for people fleeing violence, taking in hundreds 
of thousands, and sometimes millions, of refugees, usually for several years 
if not decades. Of the millions of Syrians who have fled their country since 
2011, more than 2 million re-settled in Turkey, more than 1 million in Leba-
non (where Syrians now make up roughly a third of the total population), more 
than half a million to Jordan, and several hundreds of thousands to Iraq and 
Egypt. Likewise, hundreds of thousands of Eritrean refugees and about half a 
million South Sudanese refugees have relocated to Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and 
Uganda. The same is true for the disproportionate number of refugees from 
Afghanistan and Iraq, who have primarily moved into neighboring countries. 
That some among these untold millions of displaced people would also seek 
to move toward Europe cannot be surprising. Any of these countries of the 
so-called Global South would surely have far greater grounds to speak of a “refu-
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gee crisis” than the EU. Indeed, by contrast, British politicians and news media 
began to refer to a “crisis” at Calais in the summer of 2015, when the border bar-
riers were charged by only several hundred (or at most, two or three thousand) 
migrants and refugees, whom the British Prime Minister himself depicted as 
“swarms.” Moreover, it is also vital to recognize that European wealth, power, 
and prestige have long been deeply implicated in the imperial domination and 
pillage of the same countries and regions of the so-called Global South from 
which these migrant and refugee movements originate. Such European impli-
cated-ness of course includes not only histories of direct colonial plunder and 
domination, but also various manifestations of past and present interference, 
investment, and intervention as well as disregard and malign neglect that have 
contributed to violent postcolonial instability and the consequent dislocations 
that have “uprooted” migrants and refugees in the first place. Thus, refusing 
the methodological Europeanism (Garelli and Tazzioli 2013b) of this statistical 
spectacle allows (and requires) us to ask: Whose crisis is this?
 Challenging the ways in which numbers are deployed is not to suggest that 
the changing number of migrant and refugee arrivals in Europe is in any sense 
politically insignificant. The year 2015 has indeed been a historic and monu-
mental year of migration for Europe precisely because disobedient mass mobil-
ities have disrupted the European regime of border control. As critical scholars 
of migration, maintaining a “critical distance” from this numbers game in 
our own research is important in itself, but what seems all the more urgent 
is a more elementary general skepticism toward the spectacle of numbers in 
favor of questioning how, why, by and for whom, and to what ends these acts of 
(official) counting are performed. As Nando Sigona (2015) has pointed out, for 
example, the release of figures on migrant and refugee arrivals plays a crucial 
role in framing and generating public debate. In that knowledge, therefore, the 
European border agency Frontex released data suggesting that, as of September 
2015, 710,000 “migrants” had entered the EU. However, comparing these num-
bers to those collected by the IOM and the UN (which differed substantially), 
Sigona detected that Frontex had in fact been double-counting: they elided 
the difference between multiple entries (or attempted entries) by individual 
migrants with the specter of a multiplicity of migrants, repeatedly counting the 
same individuals who had each crossed into EU territory several times as so 
many distinct “migrants.” Likewise, the de facto “uncountability” of many of 
the newly arrived has equally been instrumentalized in discourses calling for 
heightened “border protection.” The “crisis of the Schengen system,” largely 
provoked by the inability or unwillingness of many governments to register 
“asylum-seekers” desiring to simply transit through their countries in order to 
reach central and northern EU member states, have thus exacerbated imaginar-
ies and rhetorics surrounding “the uncounted” (and thus uncontrolled) “illegal” 
migrant as a purportedly “dangerous” other within Europe. 
 Statistics then, beyond their seeming “objectivity,” play a crucial role in 
framing a given phenomenon as a seemingly self-evident “problem,” and simi-
larly are instrumental for shaping affective and political responses to it. The bor-
der spectacle that Nicholas De Genova (2002; 2013b) has incisively analyzed is 
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therefore at work in the very production of statistics but it is also further gener-
ated and sustained through the mobilization of the resultant numbers: statistics 
of interceptions on land or at sea appear to quantify an otherwise elusive and 
amorphous “threat,” which only becomes “real” and “objective” to the extent that 
it is measurable. Once counted, then, the alleged “problem” is effectively objec-
tif ied, and its “reality” appears to be verified. Ironically, this “threat” thus seems 
to materialize only in the moment of its neutralization through capture by the 
police power of the state. Through the production of such numbers and the 
spectacle of statistics, then, it is simultaneously the fetishized menace of “illegal 
migration” and the securitizing work of states and their border policing agen-
cies that are made visible and given a semblance of “reality.” Hence, alongside 
other border spectacles, the spectacle of numbers assists in the construction 
of illegalized migration as “the problem” to which border and other immigra-
tion law enforcement measures must be addressed, while the political disorder 
and economic catastrophes that migrants and refugees have fled are relegated 
by implication to the status of a mere externality, someone else’s responsibility 
“elsewhere.” Furthermore, the European border and immigration regime itself, 
which directly produces the illegalized condition of these migrants and refu-
gees in the first place, appears to simply need further fortification. Hence, the 
statistical construction of the magnitude of the “problem” of migration predict-
ably leads merely to more securitized and militarized tactics of border control 
(see also De Genova 2011; 2013a). 
 Notably, a spectacle of statistics is comparably at work in relation to the “debt 
crisis,” “the financial crisis,” and all the related avatars of “the crisis” in which 
the graphic representation of quantitative data (such as credit ratings, currency 
ratings, growth rates, and so forth) proliferate in the daily news  – as if they 
communicated anything meaningful about our actual economic conditions 
(Antoniades 2012). The statistics that otherwise might allow us to discern the 
deeper dynamics that led to the “debt crisis” – specifically, who has benefited 
from or been devastated by them – almost never enjoy such spectacular prom-
inence. For example, the dramatic surge in the shares of aggregate wealth and 
income monopolized by the richest 0.1% of the population that was enabled by 
the turn to neoliberal strategies of accumulation beginning in the 1970s, while 
real wages and living standards plummeted for the great majority, would suf-
fice to point to an epochal “restoration of class power” (Harvey 2005). Likewise, 
other statistics – for example, showing the differential expenditures of EU states 
over time, state revenues from taxes, and the inequalities of tax structures   – 
would allow us to see that it is not that EU states that are imprudent “spend-
thrifts” but rather that through neoliberal reforms and tax cuts for those with 
higher incomes, a significant portion of wealth has been increasingly kept in 
(or returned to) private hands. For years, increasing public and private indebt-
edness was facilitated and manipulated through financial markets, and thereby 
made vulnerable to speculation. In the wake of the 2007–08 financial crisis, 
however, the speculative logic of these markets (through which debts had come 
to be financed) increased public debt exponentially, to the inordinate benefit of 
banks and financial services corporations but to the excruciating detriment of 
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social welfare (Attac 2011: 46–62). Thus, we may detect again that the spectacle 
of numbers in the production of “the migration crisis” – where statistics are 
also persistently mobilized to generate the specter of onerous public costs in the 
form of social welfare spending for “opportunistic” migrants and “undeserving” 
refugees – must be made legible alongside the perfect opacity of the statistics 
that otherwise conceal the extent of our deepening generalized immiseration 
through neoliberal strategies of capital accumulation.
MS, CH, NDG
 “HUMANITARIAN CRISIS”
Beyond the ongoing disputes and unresolved debates among politicians, poli-
cy-makers, advocates, journalists, and scholars over the validity or usefulness 
of the labels “refugee” or “migrant” for designating those who have come to 
Europe over recent months or years seeking asylum, what is plainly at stake 
today in the border regions of Europe is a mass displacement of people fleeing 
the violence and disruptions of life arising from wars, occupations, insurgen-
cies, and civil wars. It has become convenient politically to attribute much of 
the current “crisis” to events in Syria (where there continues to be a pertinent 
question of continuing, renewed, or expanded military intervention by various 
global or regional powers), but the mobilities of people from Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Libya, Somalia, Mali, among many other countries of origin, immediately raise 
the specters of warfare, invasions, and protracted military occupations perpe-
trated by various European powers (albeit usually alongside the United States). 
In short, the so-called “refugee crisis” in Europe has its origins to a significant 
extent in areas of severe conflict that have been instigated or aggravated directly 
by strategic European geo-political and economic interests across the globe. 
 Thus, it is indispensable to identify the war-migration nexus as an essen-
tial part of what today needs to be deeply investigated both for re-thinking a 
politics of asylum beyond the well-established exclusionary criteria and for 
revitalizing a critique of the larger European border regime (see “Politics of pro-
tection” in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). Over the last few years, the government 
of migration in the Mediterranean Sea in particular has been characterized by 
military-humanitarian interventions intended to simultaneously “rescue” and 
“interdict” migrants. Operations such as Italy’s Mare Nostrum and Frontex’s 
Triton, focused on the task of intercepting migrant vessels even prior to their 
distress at sea, have directly contributed to this sort of militarized humanitar-
ianism. Through this equivocal politics of “rescue,” and of course always as a 
result of the restrictions imposed by EU-rope’s Schengen visa regime, subjects 
“in need of protection” have been effectively forced to convert themselves into 
shipwrecked lives to be saved at sea. Meanwhile, a concomitant politics of pre-
emptive containment has involved preventing migrants from even leaving Lib-
ya’s shores to come to Europe to seek asylum, and has been enacted through 
the negotiation of various bilateral agreements with so-called “third countries” 
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in order to fortify the “pre-frontiers” of Europe. Furthermore, the launch in the 
summer of 2015 of the EU military mission EUNavFor-Med has been officially 
promoted as a “war against smugglers” and as a militarized strategy for protect-
ing migrants from “traffickers,” but in fact signifies the coordination at the EU 
level of efforts to contain migrant and refugee mobilities and forcefully obstruct 
and disable the logistics of migratory crossings at sea. Meanwhile, increasingly 
during the second half of 2015, the “politics of rescue” has been substantially 
replaced with enforcement policies aimed at either blocking or repelling ref-
ugees and migrants at the eastern borders of EU-rope. Simultaneously, new 
measures are underway to install asylum processing centers in Turkey in order 
to circumvent the continued intrusion of the “refugee crisis” onto “European” 
territory. In this respect, notably, not only border policing as such but also the 
asylum system itself becomes implicated in the further externalization of the 
EU’s border controls (see “Externalization” in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). 
 Humanitarianism has thus been conscripted to play a crucial role in 
re-framing the governmental rationale of “migration management” and bor-
der control amidst an escalation of border deaths: refugees and migrants, or 
rather, “people in need of protection” – in striking contrast with those who were 
previously suspected of being “fake” or “bogus” refugees – have increasingly 
come to be represented in the mass media and governmental discourses as vul-
nerable and desperate persons to be “saved” from the perils of maritime cross-
ings on unseaworthy boats, and thereby “protected” from their own migratory 
aspirations as well as the real or imagined predations of “criminal” syndicates 
of migrant “smugglers.” Nevertheless, refiguring these migrants and refugees 
thus as “victims” in need of protection and rescue has not in any substantial 
way undermined the simultaneous socio-political and legal construction of 
them as “illegal” (and hence, undesirable and unwelcome) “migrants,” finally 
susceptible for detention and deportation. On the other hand, the humanitarian 
purview of border control re-institutes the implicit opposition between “refu-
gees” and (“economic”) “migrants,” routinely invoked to legitimize the former 
and stigmatize the latter. By implication, unlike “mere” migrants (figured as 
opportunistic and lawless), “refugees” (figured as innocent victims) deserve to 
be rescued. 
 However, particularly in the aftermath of the spectacle of terrorism, with 
France’s proclamation of a “state of emergency” in reaction to the 13 November 
2015 attacks in Paris, and in the wake of the moral panic over sexual assaults 
during the 2016 New Year’s Eve events in Cologne/Köln – along with the various 
re-establishments of EU internal border controls in the face of the more gen-
eral “refugee crisis” – the refugee has been recently re-figured as the potential 
“terrorist” who surreptitiously infiltrates the space of Europe, or as the poten-
tial “criminal” or “rapist” who corrodes the social and moral fabric of “Europe” 
from within. Nebulous and spectral affiliations are invoked to encompass ref-
ugees, migrants, “smugglers,” “sexual deviants,” “criminals,” “terrorists,” and 
“foreign fighters” as an inchoate continuum: hence, the “fake” asylum-seeker 
re-appears now not only as the actual (duplicitous) “economic migrant,” but 
also as the (deviant) “rapist” whose “culture” or “morals” are simply inimical to 
the “European” way of life, or as the (devious) “terrorist” who conceals himself 
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among the “genuine” refugees in order to wreak havoc upon “Europe.” Thus, 
the misleading binary opposition between “migrants” and “refugees” is further 
complicated through the insinuation of a tricky continuum ranging from peo-
ple “in need of protection” to “predators” or “enemies” against whom “Europe” 
itself must be protected.
 The hyper-visibility of various border scenes of “rescue” are invariably 
accompanied by “the obscene supplement” of “subordinate inclusion” (De 
Genova 2013b; see also “Differential inclusion/exclusion” in Casas-Cortes et al. 
2015). What happens to migrants and refugees after the spectacularized scene of 
perilous arrival, “rescue,” and disembarkation – particularly, after being rejected 
as refugees – is systematically overshadowed. Thus, the spectacularization of 
“the humanitarian crisis” obscures other realities, most notably the subordi-
nate incorporation of “rejected asylum-seekers” and other illegalized migrants 
through the exploitation of their labor (see “Migrant labour” in Casas-Cortes et 
al. 2015). Furthermore, alongside these (non-EU citizen) “asylum-seeker” work-
ers, there is the invisibilization of the untold hundreds of thousands of EU-cit-
izen workers employed in many of the same jobs under virtually the same or 
very comparable conditions, from agricultural labor to low-paid marginal ser-
vice work in cities, such as various forms of domestic service or cleaning offices. 
Hence, the spectacle of “humanitarian crisis” serves to occlude other possible 
narratives and analyses concerning cross-border mobility, and – by thus effec-
tively re-bordering these parallel mobilities and social conditions and re-for-
tifying the juridical inequalities of the regime of citizenship – fuels divisions 
and antagonisms between “citizens” and “migrants” over access to work and 
resources. Simultaneously, as with any other “emergency,” the humanitarian 
“crisis” is seized upon as an economic opportunity. Here, border externaliza-
tion does not operate only in relation to mechanisms of rescue / selection / 
immigration control  – all highly lucrative enterprises for the military-securi-
ty-prison-industrial complex – but is also evidenced in the forms through which 
refugee and asylum-seeker management (which serve simultaneously as forms 
of containment and control) are provided, through the devolution or outsourc-
ing of diverse types of service provision (from screening to housing to coun-
seling) to private companies and third-sector organizations. Whether mired in 
high-profile public scandals, as was the case with the “Mafia Capitale” affair in 
Italy (which exposed the entanglements of politicians from across the spectrum 
with neo-fascist gangs and profiteering service providers), or ensconced in the 
ordinary workings of the governmental machinery, as in Sweden (where the 
costs of accommodation for asylum-seekers charged by private companies are 
exorbitant), the management of migrants and refugees under the humanitarian 
regime is a multi-million-euro business. 
 The “humanitarian crisis” has thus been pivotal for the consolidation of a 
governmental regime comprising a complex ensemble of public authorities, 
private businesses, and third-sector agencies collaborating in various ways in 
the management and control of “asylum seekers” and “refugees,” enacting a 
minimalist biopolitics that ensures their most basic needs of survival, rather 
than facilitating the expression of their autonomous subjectivities and the pur-
suit of their migratory projects. Indeed, through various legal restrictions (such 
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as expressly temporary juridical statuses or prohibitions on mobility, residence, 
and work), coupled with spatial confinement or social segregation, the human-
itarian regime aims to produce and discipline “passive”(victimized) subjects, 
who – if they transgress these restrictions and violate the multiple borders and 
legal constraints imposed by humanitarian government  – are immediately 
treated as “suspect” or “dangerous” people: they are summarily illegalized and 
must consequently be brought under extraordinary control and surveillance. 
Vacillating between treating the migrants and refugees on unseaworthy boats 
in the Mediterranean Sea as “victims” to be “rescued,” while thereafter (within 
the ensuing days, weeks, or months) seeking to arrest and discipline them as 
“illegal” border crossers when they attempt to continue their migratory tra-
jectories further onward in EU-rope, the “humanitarian crisis” is a sign of the 
vexations that both EU and nation-state authorities confront in classifying and 
regimenting these contested and disobedient mobilities.
MT, NDG, EF, IP, MS
 “MOBILITY”
The consolidation of the Schengen zone within which border controls were 
eliminated, and more generally, the institutionalization of the ostensible “right” 
to freedom of movement within the EU for the citizens of signatory states, have 
been defining hallmarks of European integration during recent decades. The 
contemporary “crisis” of migration in Europe dramatically exposes the deep 
limits and exclusionary dimensions of these particular EU-ropean formula-
tions of “freedom” in the context of the broader government of human mobility. 
Recently, and repeatedly during 2015, the “right” to freedom of movement for 
EU citizens and denizens alike has been more and more restricted, and bor-
der controls within the Schengen area have been re-introduced. Nonetheless, 
migrants and refugees simply keep arriving. Hence, the measures for governing 
mobility and ostensibly stopping “unwanted” migratory movements – particu-
larly, the movements of those who are considered to be deficient according to 
dominant criteria of “employability,” or those purported to lack properly “Euro-
pean values,” and thus, according to racist rationales, who may be considered 
a “threat” to “Europe” – have simultaneously been continuously confounded 
as migrants persistently defy these controls. The incorrigibility of these auton-
omous mobilities has consequently prompted the repeated announcement of 
new “crises” (such as the “refugee crisis” or alarmist proclamations about a par-
allel “crisis” of “poverty migration”). Here, of course, we are reminded of the 
long history by which the mobility of labor has served simultaneously as both a 
resource for capitalism as well as a disruptive and potentially subversive force 
(see “Migrant labour” in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015).
 National governments in the EU’s wealthier member states (such as Ger-
many or the UK) resort to discourses of “poverty migration” to problematize spe-
cifically “European” mobilities as the ostensibly “unwanted” by-product of the 
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larger regime of “free” mobility within the EU. “Mobility,” it would seem, turns 
into “migration” quite easily. According to this rhetoric, “mobility” pertains to 
those who bring investment or enhance profitability, whereas “migrants” are 
those who perennially threaten the viability of “national” economies and social 
welfare systems (see “Differential inclusion/exclusion” in Casas-Cortes et al. 
2015). Through the imposition of various restrictions on access to social ben-
efits, the putative “right” to mobility is rendered profoundly conditional, as it 
becomes thoroughly contingent upon access to “regular” work contracts in the 
formal labor market. Those who cannot meet more or less stringent require-
ments are designated to be economically “inactive” and consequently denied 
various social rights, and may be subjected to harsh regimes of workfare, or 
even eviction and deportation (van Baar 2012; Riedner 2015). For example, Bel-
gium recently expelled more than 7,000 EU citizens because they had worked 
with formal labor contracts for fewer than twelve months and had been unem-
ployed for more than six months prior to expulsion. Thus they were deemed an 
unbearable burden on the welfare state.7 For many, then, the much-celebrated 
EU-ropean “freedom of movement” is not a right in any substantive sense, but 
rather serves to intensify the neoliberal obligation to be engaged in wage labor 
or some other form of productive economic activity, and thus to accept increas-
ingly precaritized working and living conditions. This process of re-disciplining 
labor goes hand in hand with conditionalization of social rights, their pervasive 
denigration as mere “dependency” on welfare benefits, and the withdrawal of 
mobile persons’ “right” to stay. 
 We begin to detect, furthermore, that the “migrant” predicament is not 
reducible only to the potential withdrawal or conditionality of the simple 
“rights” to move or to stay, but also the more expansive (partial, differential) 
exclusion from the substantive entitlements of citizenship, such as access to 
state services and social welfare benefits, and thus also a withdrawal of social, 
labor, and political “rights” (see “Differential exclusion” in Casas-Cortes et al. 
2015). This corresponds closely to what Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson 
(2013) have described as the “multiplication of labor.” Thus, current attempts 
to restrict “internal” (EU) mobilities could be interpreted as experiments within 
the EU-ropean neoliberal laboratory for governing migration without border 
controls as “free” but highly conditioned mobilities, whereby migrants are none-
theless subjected to the conditionalities and contingencies imposed through the 
amplification of “workfare”-like technologies of government (Riedner 2015).
 The current “economic crisis” and the resultant widespread increase in 
precaritization have triggered various re-orientations of mobility across and 
also beyond “Europe,” contributing to the (renewed) “migrantization” of var-
ious EU-ropean citizens and denizens alike. In the protracted context of “cri-
sis”-driven neoliberal austerity across Europe, there has been noteworthy 
evidence of new forms of migration as well as reversals in the direction of 
more long-standing migratory processes. Hence, migrants originally from the 
so-called Global South who now possess Spanish or Italian passports abandon 
joblessness and home foreclosures in the debt-strangled “European South” and 
relocate to more prosperous northern European countries, now as EU citizens 
7. http://www.connessioniprecarie.org/2014/ 
12/05/the-government-of-mobility- 
1-conditioned-freedom-and-mobility-on- 
probation/
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availing themselves of their “right” to mobility. Meanwhile, an additional con-
sequence of economic “crisis” and austerity in Europe has been a noteworthy 
increase in mobility out of EU-rope altogether. Spanish and Italian nationals, for 
instance, have increasingly migrated as “tourists,” overstayed visas, and sought 
“irregular” residence and employment in North Africa or South America. 
 Notably, the movement of young Europeans with relatively high levels of for-
mal education or skill migrating (within or out of Europe) in search of employ-
ment opportunities – particularly in “unskilled” work – signifies that mobility 
is also inseparable from processes of “de-skilling.” For instance, the increased 
presence of (formerly unemployed) Spanish citizens who have recently moved 
to Morocco to find jobs in call centers is a considerable phenomenon. The 
estimated number of Spaniards currently based in Morocco is approximately 
25,000, while the number of those who are registered at the Spanish consulate 
as residents is only about 3,500. Of course, the conditions of migrant “irregular-
ity” for Europeans in North African countries such as Morocco or Tunisia are in 
no sense comparable with the illegalization in those countries of sub-Saharan 
migrants (usually with aspirations of eventually making their way to “Europe”). 
Thus, there is increasing evidence of a kind of “differential illegality,” with quite 
glaringly unequal implications for distinct categories of migrants’ divergently 
racialized lives: detainability and deportability for sub-Saharan (Black) migrants, 
on the one hand, and benign neglect and tolerated presence for European 
(white) migrants, on the other. This example helps to clarify that the “migrant” 
condition cannot be reduced narrowly to legal status alone, and that the actual 
ways in which distinct categories of people and their respective mobilities are 
effectively governed must be carefully taken into account. However, the re-ori-
entation of mobility across the Mediterranean is not limited to “Europeans” 
moving southward: return migrations from Europe to the Maghreb (and many 
other countries and regions of origin) has likewise been a significant but largely 
undocumented and unmapped phenomenon that should be investigated in its 
global articulation with the effects of “the crisis” in Europe. 
 Likewise, EU-uropean nationals have increasingly been migrating out of 
the continent altogether, particularly to Latin America and the Caribbean. A 
recent study carried out by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
reveals, furthermore, that since 2010 this trend has been accompanied by a 
marked decrease in the movement of people in the other direction. For the first 
time since the year 2000, more people migrated from Europe to Latin America 
than the reverse: in the year 2012, for example, approximately 182,000 Euro-
pean nationals left for Latin American and Caribbean countries, as compared to 
approximately 119,000 Latin American and Caribbean nationals who moved to 
the EU (IOM 2015). The leading EU-ropean countries of this recent out-migra-
tion notably include not only debt-strangled Spain, Italy, and Portugal, but also 
France and Germany. Among these, the Spanish case is truly remarkable. This 
Spanish migration has, due to shared language and historical interconnections, 
perhaps predictably prioritized Latin America as its main destination. Accord-
ing to the Fundación Alternativas,8 some 700,000 Spaniards left the country 
between 2008 and 2012. Figures from Spain’s National Statistics Institute 
8. http://www.fundacionalternativas.org
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(INE) show that another 547,890 people left in 2013. However, the profile of 
these European migrants is notably not reducible to that of “return migrants.” 
In other words, this is not simply a statistical illusion generated by Latin Amer-
ican or Caribbean migrants returning from Europe to their home countries. 
Instead, the majority of these European migrants are “crisis migrants” (or, 
rather, austerity refugees)  – native-born “Europeans,” now turned “economic 
migrants,” seeking new life and job opportunities in countries such as Ecuador, 
Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Peru, or Bolivia, places that have conventionally been 
almost exclusively depicted as “sending” countries. 
 Despite these extraordinary numbers, however, this significant rever-
sal in the configuration of “migration” in the European context has not been 
depicted in the European media or dominant political discourse as a European 
“migration crisis.” Apparently, “Europeans” cannot be conceived as “economic 
migrants.” Such a categorization is customarily overburdened with racial, gen-
der, class, and national prejudices, and evidently reserved for those who migrate 
from the impoverished (formerly colonized) countries of the so-called Global 
South (“peripheral” countries, in the place formerly known as the Third World) 
to the rich ones fashioned as “the core” of the world economic system, where 
“European” countries, particularly the former colonial powers, historically 
secured their self-styled centrality. Thus, it seems to be no longer quite a “nat-
ural” or self-evident condition that “Europe” is figured as a space of prosper-
ity that acts as a magnet for “economic migrants” from the “underdeveloped” 
countries. In the contemporary “crisis” scenario, Europeans have increasingly 
joined ranks with Africans, Asians and Latin Americans as mobile persons 
compelled to seek their fortunes and new life opportunities in faraway lands. 
However, the juridical and socio-political conditions under which Europeans 
migrate outwards predictably are utterly different from those imposed by the 
European border regime: Latin American and Caribbean countries generally 
receive the European newcomers with open arms, with virtually no immigra-
tion restrictions imposed on them. Nevertheless, these contemporary reversals 
of European mobility are important signals of a reversal of fortune for EU-rope. 
Yet, this reversal in the direction of migratory movement is seldom taken as 
evidence that European countries are plagued by “failed” economies, or that the 
neoliberal ambush of European welfare states has proven incapable of prevent-
ing the exit of their citizens due to the increasingly acute precaritization of their 
living conditions. 
 Undoubtedly, the process of selectively labeling some migrant and refugee 
mobilities as a “migration crisis” while concealing the “crisis migration” of oth-
ers has profound and productive effects. Reinforcing anti-immigrant racism 
and nativist hostilities, perpetuating postcolonial bigotries, and aggravating 
forms of both blatant and subtle violence against those deemed to be “non-Eu-
ropeans” all serve to de-fuse or re-direct some of the potentially most explosive 
socio-political dynamics constituting Europe today (De Genova 2015; De Genova 
and Tazzioli 2015). Nevertheless, the massive movement of unemployed or 
under-employed EU citizens toward the most prosperous EU countries, usually 
to work in low-paid service jobs beneath their formal qualifications, is another 
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major feature of the contemporary processes of “crisis migration” in EU-rope, 
more generally. Consequently, alongside the predictable anti-immigrant racism 
toward (“non-European”) “foreigners,” the increasingly shrill anti-immigrant 
politics of countries such as Britain over recent years have been discursively 
re-tooled, now predominantly obsessed with “migration” from the rest of 
EU-rope.
 In times of “crisis,” therefore, we must ask anew: Who has become a migrant? 
Which forms of human mobility are classif ied, or recognized, or disavowed as man-
ifestations of “migration”? Moreover, it is crucial to ask: Who does, and who does 
not, come to be governed as a “migrant”? These developments signal noteworthy 
transformations. Some forms of “mobility” have been converted into “migra-
tion” (as in the transformation of intra-EU “mobility” from southern or eastern 
Europe into labor markets in more prosperous northern and western European 
countries); likewise, some forms of “migration” have turned into “mobility” (as 
in the “secondary migrations” of Latin Americans or Africans from Spain or 
Italy into other European countries following their “regularization” and acqui-
sition of European passports, or similarly, the summary reclassification of pre-
viously undocumented migratory movements from eastern European countries 
into western European labor markets following the accession of their countries 
of origin to EU membership and consequently, their reclassification as EU citi-
zens engaged in their rightful free “mobility”). The EU-ropean experiment with 
mobility thus offers a striking context in which to contemplate how cross-bor-
der mobility alone does not necessarily become apprehensible as “migration,” 
and likewise, how juridical status alone (e.g. “illegal migrant,” “refugee,” “EU 
citizen,” “tourist,” “diplomat” and so on) seems insufficient to enclose a mobile 
person within (or release her from) the socio-political burdens of becoming a 
“migrant.”
 If “migration” cannot be adequately defined in exclusively juridical 
terms – according to which kind of border is crossed, and under which legal 
parameters – we must consider, furthermore, whether the very classification 
of particular forms of mobility as “migration” always already imply particular 
forms of discrimination and domination. Here, we must immediately con-
front the diverse ways in which the problematization of particular mobilities 
as “migration” raise questions of difference and “foreign”-ness that may be 
overtly constructed in either “cultural” or narrowly legal terms, but are none-
theless principally constituted according to logics of race and class. We are 
reminded therefore of what Nicholas De Genova (2016) has called the “Euro-
pean” Question, and the always ambivalent and unstable constitution of “Euro-
pean” identity in relation to the putative “outside” of “Europe” (understood to be 
a postcolonial formation of racial whiteness) and simultaneously in relation to 
those who inhabit the amorphous extended borderlands of “Europe” itself and 
their “not yet” or “not quite” status as “white”/“European.” 
 Here, and particularly in the case of the “mobility” of (South) Eastern Euro-
peans, we deal with a newly articulated form of what Maria Todorova (1994; 
1997) has called “Balkanism”: that specific and ambiguous kind of Orientalized 
imagination and representation according to which, due to its alleged “infe-
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rior” status, southeastern Europe, or “the Balkans,” simultaneously does and 
does not belong to “Europe.” At the time of Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution in 
the 1990s, Balkanistic reasoning served as one of the dominant ways to legiti-
mize “military-humanitarian” interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. While these 
practices were frequently considered to be interventions in a space external to 
“Europe,” at the same time they were commonly legitimized on the basis of the 
contention that crimes against humanity “on European soil” were an intolerable 
scandal and had to be combatted (Balibar 2002/2004: 1–6). And even while the 
then-manifest Balkanism was operationalized as a kind of “nested” Orientalism 
(according to which, for instance, “the Serbs” would be more “brutal,” “violent,” 
and “cruel” than “the Croats”), in the end, all of the Balkan “peoples” were none-
theless considered to be effectively indistinguishable and comparably “prob-
lematic,” for they could all be expected to resort to “ancient hatreds” and violent 
“primordial” nationalisms. As Slavoj Žižek (2000) has argued in his reflection 
on the “Western” imagination of the Balkans, what “Balkanism” offers to the 
Western gaze is “what it likes to see in the Balkans.” This is “a kind of exotic 
spectacle that should either be tamed or quarantined . . . a mythical spectacle of 
eternal, primordial passions, of the vicious cycle of hate and love, in contrast 
to the decadent and anemic life in the West.” In the contemporary version of 
Balkanism, those who are coming from (South) Eastern Europe to western 
Europe to look for work opportunities, or to flee socio-political circumstances 
(particularly in the case of the Roma), are again considered to be largely indis-
tinguishable – but now are homogenized as “poverty migrants,” “social (bene-
fits) tourists,” “bogus asylum seekers” or “fake refugees” (see also footnote 6, 
above). While, in public discourse and political debate, this representation of 
citizens from the new or candidate EU member states has been predominantly 
mobilized to “irregularize” the status of Roma and to “securitize” their situa-
tion (van Baar 2015), we have nevertheless been able to observe a trend towards 
what could be considered to be a more general “Gypsification” of all (South) 
Eastern Europeans, according to which they are racialized on the basis of many 
of the stereotypes that are customarily attributed to Roma through the derisive 
“Gypsy” label (as lazy, dirty, criminal, irresponsible, profiteering, and so on).
 At the same time, particularly when they move across the purportedly “bor-
derless” space of EU-rope, racially minoritized Europeans of Roma or Sinti 
backgrounds (most of them EU nationals and, thus, EU citizens) are often 
designated officially as “nomads,” and effectively pathologized as incorrigibly 
mobile “populations.” Despite this specter of “excessive” mobility, however, 
nation-state governments and local municipalities enact enforcement measures 
precisely in order to obstruct Roma / Sinti settlement and to re-mobilize them 
by subjecting them to coercive evictions and displacement. To truly understand 
such regimes of EU-internal migration, however, we must also move beyond 
simplistic critiques of the racism against “Roma” and “Sinti” that naturalize 
these very identities, and thereby become complicit in the imposition of such 
racialized (“ethnic”) categories from above. Particularly when what is at stake 
is often a racialization – or specifically, a “Gypsification” – of poverty (Van Baar 
2016b), it seems more productive to ask who comes to be racialized as “Roma” 
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or “Sinti,” under what circumstances, and how these categories are contested 
and with which effects. This analytical perspective also opens up possibilities to 
better understand the strategic and situational character of the particular strug-
gles of self-identified “minorities” for rights and recognition. Thus, the mobility 
of the poor, and especially the racially stigmatized poor – even despite ostensi-
ble EU citizenship – is scarcely tolerated, and subjected to special policies and 
regimes of evictability (van Baar 2015; 2016a). Paradoxically, it seems that as 
soon as these “unwelcome” mobile “citizens” use their “right to free movement” 
and look for better labor opportunities outside their countries of birth, they are 
summarily converted into (deportable) “migrants.” Thus, the EU-ropean gov-
ernment of mobility entails (specifically neoliberal) experiments with borders 
and migration through the modulation of the “freedom of mobility,” establish-
ing various terms and conditions related to formal and regular employment and 
economic “independence” that enhance new conjunctures of racism and pro-
duce new zones of internalized borders and boundaries.
 The “migrantization” of various distinct but related practices of mobility is 
a phenomenon that until now has remained rather un-remarked, under-the-
orized, and un-mapped, as the meaning and the socio-political condition of 
being “governed like a migrant” cannot be adequately comprehended within 
the narrow parameters of juridical status alone. In this scenario, intra-EU-
ropean mobility has provided a socio-political context in which the autonomy 
of human mobilities of various kinds unsettles and challenges the dominant 
neoliberal model of internal (EU / Schengen) “freedom of circulation.” These 
mobilities have thereby produced unforeseen fractures and divisions within the 
“European” space itself – between the presumptive (self-anointed and self-au-
thorizing) “core” of Europe and the southern and eastern “frontiers” and “tran-
sit zones” where the putative “inside” and “outside” of “Europe” have become 
increasingly blurred and confounded.
LR, SAV, NDG, MT, HvB
 (THE CRISIS OF) “EUROPEAN VALUES”
What, indeed, are the values often referred to as distinctly “European”? How has 
the project of European integration, now effectively synonymous with the Euro-
pean Union, ensured that such “European” values have been re-branded as spe-
cifically EU-ropean? The European Commission asserts that the EU “is founded 
on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities.”9 Purportedly conceived around this set of supposedly shared val-
ues, the EU is routinely lauded as a “post-national” enterprise where sovereign 
power is shared amongst its member states, for the collective good of all. The 
several stages of EU enlargement and integration were formulated around the 
key accession criteria of respect for, and promotion of, the EU’s “democratic” 
values, and among the chief characteristics of (properly) “European” societies 
9. http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/
objectives_en.htm#VALUES 
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are counted: “pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men.”10 For its efforts to create a community 
“united in diversity,” the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 and 
in their acceptance speech “From War to Peace: A European Tale,” European 
Commission President Barroso and President of the European Council Rom-
puy declared: “Over the past sixty years, the European project has shown that it 
is possible for peoples and nations to come together across borders. That it is 
possible to overcome the differences between ‘them’ and ‘us’.”11 Indeed, for a 
time, many on the Left across Europe also entertained the illusion that the proj-
ect of “Europe” might present openings that seemed to promise possibilities for 
a politics that could transcend the European legacies of nationalism, fascism, 
the Nazi genocides of the Jews, Roma, and Sinti, the treacheries of Stalinism, 
the impasse of the Cold War, and the bitter disillusionments of “post-socialism.” 
Nonetheless, numerous scholars have noted the contradictions inherent in the 
vision of liberal democracy on which the EU-ropean project relies for legiti-
macy. As Talal Asad notes, while “it is often conceded that several peoples and 
cultures inhabit the European continent,” it is also believed, seemingly paradox-
ically, that “there is a single history that articulates European civilization – and 
therefore European identity” (2003:170). It is indeed this homogenized civili-
zational and identitarian Europeanism that riddles the “European” project with 
the incontrovertible contradictions of its own (post-)coloniality. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely this agonistic project of re-stabilizing a “European” identity that requires 
a fatuous discourse of “European values,” which in fact serves no other end than 
to re-inscribe and re-affirm “the differences between ‘them’ and ‘us’.” 
 The “single history that articulates European civilization,” of course, has 
always looked strikingly different from the standpoint of those who were colo-
nized, enslaved, tortured, raped, mutilated, or massacred by Europeans in their 
diverse but interconnected quests for imperial power in the consolidation of 
global capitalism. Indeed, such values as the respect for human dignity, lib-
erty, equality, solidarity, democracy, pluralism, tolerance, justice, and so forth 
would appear instead to have been the precious achievements of struggles that 
were always fundamentally and profoundly anti-European. There was, after all, 
never a moment in the history of modern slavery that was not riddled with the 
specter of sabotage, defiance, and insurrection, nor any moment in the history 
of European colonialism that was not similarly haunted by resistance, mutiny, 
and insurgency. In these contexts, furthermore, the hallowed “rule of law” was 
usually no less than the systematic rationalization of systemic injustice and bru-
tal violence. At the very core of any contemporary values of liberty or equality, 
therefore, we must recognize the acts of individual and collective rebellion on 
the part of those whom European power sought to muzzle, throttle, and flog, 
and from whose bonded labor such an inordinate proportion of European 
wealth and prestige was mercilessly wrenched. 
 The very assertion that such values could be depicted as “European” (or 
“Western”) is itself a deplorable act of pillage and, furthermore, a re-bordering 
that would seek to impose anew a proprietary enclosure on the universal her-
itage of liberation struggles that properly correspond to the global commons. 
Indeed, the promulgation of the very notion that there is such a thing as “Euro-
10. http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/
objectives_en.htm#VALUES 
11. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
peace/laureates/2012/eu-lecture.html 
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pean” values is a core component of the contemporary project of Europeanism, 
which tends to casually elide the whole history of centuries of European colo-
nial domination around the world and the resultant global (post-)colonial fact of 
white supremacy. Thus, Europeanism today is predicated upon a staggeringly 
shallow reconstruction of “European” history as an insular and hermetical-
ly-sealed affair. Of course, amidst the current proliferation of these self-satisfied 
ideological narratives of “European” culture, civilization, values, and identity, 
the overtly racist outrages of neo-fascist / far-right populisms merely make 
explicit and blunt the delicate matter of the inextricability of any Europeanism 
from the propagation of “European”-ness as a formation of racial whiteness, 
even as it emphatically dissimulates race in favor of ostensibly “cultural” or “civ-
ilizational” constructions of difference, and above all, in most prominent oppo-
sition at present to those “values” cynically attributed to “Muslims” (De Genova 
2010a; 2015; De Genova and Tazzioli 2015). 
 Following numerous incidents in 2015 that fashioned the figure of 
“Europe’s” “Muslim” Other in securitarian terms (as a threat of religious “fun-
damentalism,” “fanaticism,” and “terrorism”), the abrupt outbreak in January 
2016 of a moral panic over a multiplicity of sexual assaults during the New 
Year’s Eve festivities in Köln/Cologne, allegedly perpetrated by “unruly mobs” 
of young men, casually characterized as being “of North African or Middle 
Eastern appearance” (and eagerly depicted as including “asylum-seekers”), 
notably reinvigorated the racialization of “Muslim” identity. In the face of these 
offenses, the racialization of “Muslims” / “Arabs” could now be represented in 
terms of unsavory “cultural” differences that must be excoriated and criminal-
ized as transparently inimical to “European values.” Thus, the rather selective 
logic of “antiterrorist” suspicion that has been mobilized for the purposes of 
more stringent (external) border enforcement, once confronted with the palpa-
ble presence of recent arrivals of “Muslim” refugees and migrants, has been 
promptly re-purposed as a considerably more expansive problem of (internal) 
policing, emphatically conjoined to arguments for new powers to expedite the 
deportation of (“criminal”) “asylum-seekers” deemed to be dangerously “defi-
cient” in terms of “European values.”
 There is a specificity to the dissimulation of race in the European context 
which has to do with the ways in which it is imagined both historically and geo-
graphically. Historically, as David Theo Goldberg (2006; 2009:151–98) argues, 
in the hegemonic European imagination, race is operative within Europe only 
to the extent that it is temporally confined to the Nazi period and principally 
concentrated on the genocide of the Jews. Geographically, it is otherwise pro-
jected outside of Europe as something that pertains to “others,” “elsewhere”: 
there is of course some public recognition in various European countries of 
the role of race and racism on the parts of their regimes in the colonies, but 
it remains paltry. Usually it is fully projected as strictly “external” to Europe, 
and not seen as a practice and legacy of “Europe,” and imagined as having no 
traces (or in any case, only negligible ones) within contemporary (“post”-colo-
nial) Europe (Gilroy 2004). Contemporary Europe “itself” – the “Europe” that 
is customarily exalted as the inheritor of universalistic “values” of the Enlight-
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enment, and the self-anointed “inventor” of liberal democracy – simply cannot 
acknowledge race, and hence pretends to know no racism. This self-concep-
tion of a race-blind “Europe,” where racism is simply a thing of the past (and 
which can only pertain now to the atavisms of the far-right fringe), is reflected 
and reinforced in EU-ropean border policies today (Jansen 2015). The presence 
and racial struggles of fellow citizens (co-nationals) with personal or family 
backgrounds in the postcolony, and the very belated, slow but steady advance 
of postcolonial critique within European universities, together are gradually 
introducing a significant (albeit still meager) shift in wider perspectives and 
sensibilities. For example, in the Netherlands, the Dutch disgrace surrounding 
Zwarte Piet (“Black Pete”) has met with increasingly vociferous controversy and 
ever-more effective critique. In France, the uncompromising decolonial mili-
tancy of the Parti des Indigènes de la République (PIR) has persistently put race 
into the foreground of contemporary debates, although this movement has met 
with unrelenting hostility from across the political spectrum, particularly in the 
contemporary neo-“Republican” ideological landscape following the reinvigora-
tion of “antiterrorist” securitarianism in 2015 (De Genova and Tazzioli 2015).
 Dissimulating race and disavowing the socio-political dynamics of racializa-
tion, Europeanism has a long history of imagining “minorities” as fundamen-
tally “different” and, by implication, inimical to properly “European” cultural 
identities and values, thus converting them into “cultural” and / or “religious” 
problems and questions: The Jewish Question, The Gypsy/Roma Question, 
The Muslim Question. The recent critical proposal to instead turn “Europe” 
itself into such a Question (De Genova 2016) invites us to reverse the focus 
and examine anew those pronouncedly European histories as formative of the 
global histories of race and imperialism. This does not mean a reducing of reli-
gious difference or the differentialization of religion to race, but rather bringing 
the socio-political history of inter-religious relations and race together. The Jew-
ish Question, Marx already noted implicitly, was always in fact the “Christian 
Question,” and it has always been intimately connected to the history of race. It 
is no coincidence that turning “Europe” into a Question has been proposed by 
scholars of critical migration and race studies more or less in tandem with those 
more directly concerned with the histories of religious difference and inequality 
in relation to secularism and secularity in the European context (Anidjar 2012; 
Jansen 2016; Nathan and Topolski 2016). Bringing the insights of those crit-
ical discourses together is of premier importance during this time of “crisis,” 
so marked by the rise of new manifestations of anti-Muslim racism complexly 
intermingled and mostly overlapping with the histories of antisemitism, Islam-
ophobia, Orientalism, and anti-Gypsyism. 
 Scrutinizing more rigorously the racial underpinnings of our “civilizational” 
categories, especially those surrounding religion, is crucial in the French con-
text, for instance, where the racial dimensions of the social position of “Arabs” 
/ “Muslims” have been pronouncedly evident at least since the first Headscarf 
controversies in 1989, but in which the sacrosanct concepts of secularism and 
laïcité simultaneously retain an aura that the French (white) left does not dare 
to question. “Secularism” thus remains wedded to a concept of religion that 
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is deeply embedded in both Christian and European racial history. Thus, a 
secularist and “Republican” ideological impasse continuously adds fuel to the 
“re-theologization” of debates that are only apprehensible in social and political 
terms (Jansen 2016). This sort of ideological refraction and the accompanying 
discursive diversionary tactics have indeed been among the eminent strategies 
for re-animating race and racism – precisely through its culturalist dissimula-
tion and disavowal (Balibar 1991; Gilroy 1987).
 Meanwhile, where race has not been completely relegated to derisive 
silence, clumsy and superficial discourses of “superdiversity” pretend to name 
the real harvest of empire that, for many decades now, has amplified the actual 
racial heterogeneity and socio-political complexity of “actually existing” Europe, 
but the notion of “superdiversity” woefully lacks any meaningful postcolonial 
analysis or decolonial critical perspective. Indeed, recourse to the anemic rhet-
oric of “superdiversity” is proffered as a comfortably de-politicized surrogate 
for previous debates around “multiculturalism,” which have long been con-
siderably more contentious precisely because they were perceived to open up 
a space for more candid engagements with race and racism, as well as other 
social formations of difference (such as religion). Whereas liberal proponents of 
“multiculturalism” promoted more pluralistic affirmations of difference, how-
ever, “multiculturalism” has also been increasingly domesticated and coopted. 
Hence, “respect for difference” and multiculturalist “tolerance” are them-
selves now retrofitted as putatively “European” values. Furthermore, as Finex 
Ndhlovu (2015) argues, the “hegemonic dominance of Euro-American perspec-
tives, which include multiculturalism and superdiversity, has meant that the 
promises held by other ways of knowing, reading and interpreting the world 
have been consigned to the fringes of mainstream identitarian discourses.” In 
addition, the systematic disregard and endemic ignorance of theory from the 
South, as Ndhlovu characterizes it, in favor of the reductionist lens of (super) 
“diversity,” merely replicates the vectors of unequal power that uphold anach-
ronistic notions of “European” identity (as a supra-national racial formation of 
whiteness) by containing and encompassing the racialized identities of suppos-
edly “non-Europeans,” both inside and outside of “Europe.” Such hegemonic 
multiculturalisms, in other words, merely reinstate the status of “non-white” 
difference within Europe as so many “non-European” exceptions – discrepan-
cies from the norm, to be “integrated,” domesticated, and neutralized. A critical 
scrutiny of “European values,” then, is necessary for a decolonial interrogation 
of “the crisis” in and of “Europe.”
 We may perhaps see most clearly how these grandiose gestures about 
“European values” in fact operate as technologies of government when they are 
“dressed down” as the more mundane (but no less pompous) “values” claimed 
as the virtues of particular nation-states. We need only consider, for instance, 
how such purportedly “fundamental British values” as “a belief in freedom” and 
“tolerance of others” become conjoined in the discourse of British Prime Min-
ister David Cameron to the neoliberal imperative of “accepting personal and 
social responsibility” and the implicitly authoritarian mandate of “respecting 
and upholding the rule of law” – all “as British,” we are assured, “as fish and 
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chips.” Unabashedly asserting that such values may be claimed as “a matter of 
pride and patriotism” regarding “traditions” that “set Britain apart,” Cameron 
goes on to congratulate the British for having given “so much of the world the 
way of life that they hold so dear.”12 That such “gifts” were the poisoned bequest 
of centuries of colonial domination, apparently, in retrospect requires no men-
tion. Writing in the era of an earlier British societal “crisis,” confronting the rise 
of neoliberal globalization and the concomitant austerity regime of Thatcher-
ism, Stuart Hall and his colleagues detected that postcolonial “crisis” – specifi-
cally, “the crisis … of an advanced industrial capitalist nation seeking to stabilise 
itself in rapidly changing conditions on an extremely weak post-imperial eco-
nomic base” – generated the conditions of possibility for “a decisive return” to 
a narrow exclusionary cultural politics of English national identity (Hall et al. 
1978). Similarly, today, the pervasive obsession with “home-grown terrorism,” 
“radicalization,” and “extremism” – while not overtly racializing “Muslims” or 
other so-called “second-generation migrants” as non-white, or directly affiliat-
ing “terrorism” with Islam – manifests a revised version of what Hall and his 
colleagues discerned in the racist right-wing demagogue Enoch Powell, as a 
“pervasive, paranoid sense of crisis facing social order and authority” (Hall et al. 
1978). Thus, the democratic ideal of “the rule of law” gets cynically transposed 
into a disciplinary demand for “respect” for the law, and converted – especially 
for “Muslims” and others racialized as “non-white” – into a punitive discourse of 
“law and order,” which is to say, ever-more draconian policing and surveillance. 
 It is unsurprising, then, that the question of (“European”) “values,” and 
therefore identity, is so acutely tied in with a discourse of “crisis.” Shorn of the 
parochialism of Cameron’s (post-Thatcherite) fish-and-chips populism, now 
elevated to the level of “European” values, such propositions become all the 
more ungrounded, abstract, and ideological. The Europeanization of the val-
ues of freedom and equality nonetheless remains a flagrant act of hijacking the 
struggles of the millions who historically languished under European rule. 
 When the very idea of “Europe” is purportedly based upon a set of values 
centered around notions of human rights, democracy, and inclusion, and when 
it sanctimoniously promotes itself as a force for peace in the world, using “soft” 
or “normative” power or even “moral” force, furthermore, the ways in which 
EU borders are enforced and human mobilities are governed must necessarily 
pose profound and radical questions for “Europe” and its cherished “values” 
(De Genova 2016). In enunciating, demarcating, and defending its complex 
borderscapes, where precisely does “Europe” (EU-rope) emerge? As what exactly 
does this “Europe” become manifest as? Who indeed is included or excluded in 
the name of Europe? 
 With the activation of migrant and refugee “illegality” at the borders of 
“Europe,” there are also differential enactments of degrees of “European”-ness, 
which is to say, different degrees of access to “legality” within (but also beyond) 
the EU-ropean space, activated as different degrees of “belonging” or potential 
“deservingness,” related to various degrees or approximations of racial “white-
ness.” When referring to the so called “refugee crisis,” for example, the Greek 
government emphasizes how Greece has shown a “human face” to the refugees 
12. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
british-values-article-by-david-cameron
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arriving by boat on the Greek islands, and has thereby purportedly exhibited 
its “European values.” Emphatically contrasting this hospitality on the Greek 
islands with the implied or explicit allegation of “inhumanity” on the part of the 
Turkish state, Greece effectively re-inscribes itself within “Europe” by depicting 
Turkey as the site, just beyond the borders of “Europe,” where “the problem” 
of a “migration” or “refugee crisis” begins. Thus, apart from the violence and 
upheaval in places such as Syria – so this particular “European” logic goes – the 
actual reason for “the crisis” is a combination of Turkish governmental disre-
gard for both the humanitarian needs of the refugees and the predatory ruth-
lessness of Turkish “smugglers” who are purported to be “sending migrants to 
their deaths.”  Hence, we see the recapitulation of Europe’s self-serving rheto-
ric of criminalizing and denigrating “the smugglers” as inhumane “criminals” 
and virtual “slave traders,” reproduced now in the reanimation of familiar ori-
entalist gestures with regard to the putative “barbarism” of Turkey. Thus, the 
Greek-Turkish maritime border across the Aegean Sea becomes implicated in 
competing projects of re-essentializing and de-essentializing the historically 
racialized boundary between “European” Greece and “Oriental” or “Asiatic” 
Turkey.
 Nevertheless, as the allegedly true starting point of “the crisis,” Turkey is 
likewise figured as the ultimate site  – emphatically “outside” of “Europe”  – 
where a “solution” must be put in place. Thus, EU-rope’s cynical strategy today, 
as has been true for several years, is to outsource its putatively “un-European” 
border violence by externalizing border enforcement to its “European” (non-EU) 
peripheries and (“non-European”) “third countries,” such as Turkey (see “Exter-
nalization,” in Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). The repeated insistence, almost a man-
tra, of all sorts of European politicians at both the national and EU levels that 
the “migrant” / “refugee crisis” should first and foremost be “managed” (if not 
“solved”) through the processing and so-called “admission” of refugees “in their 
own region” – along with simultaneously “stricter” control of the EU’s external 
borders – is fully in line with this strategy of “outsourcing” border enforcement. 
Through these and similar strategies of border externalization, however, coun-
tries such as Turkey become “valuable” junior partners in the European border 
regime with substantial leverage, and thus acquire a semblance of semi- or qua-
si-“European”-ness. Meanwhile, in exchange for Turkey’s vital service in enforc-
ing the borders of “Europe” (as well as its strategic geo-political and military 
role in the region), EU-rope casts a blind eye towards the brutal atrocities com-
mitted by the Turkish state toward its subjugated Kurdish “minority” as well as 
the repression of anti-war dissidence within Turkey. Turkish military actions 
and persecution perpetrated against the Kurds actually produce “internally dis-
placed” refugee populations, yet these systemic abuses do not really impede the 
process by which Turkey is effectively becoming more “European” – which is 
to say, more useful and valuable to the EU-ropean border regime, and thus, 
more potentially “worthy” of membership in the EU. Simultaneously, since the 
summer, following the threat of a “Grexit” (a Greek exit from the euro currency 
union as a result of the “debt crisis” and the prospect of Greece defaulting on 
its loans), a new threat has been imposed in turn on Greece: its possible expul-
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sion from the Schengen zone, precisely because Greece has been increasingly 
deemed incapable of adequately fulfilling its role as a premier watchdog at the 
EU’s border with Turkey. The question that begs attention, therefore, is the 
extent to which notions of “European”-ness become a tactically malleable and 
highly relative exchange value in relation to the convulsions of the expansive 
EU border enforcement regime. From the critical standpoint of migration and 
borders, therefore, we must demand: What exactly satisfies the requirements of 
upholding “European values” in a context where such a high premium is placed 
on being useful and valuable to the EU-ropean project and the externalized pro-
jection of “European” border zones?
 The contemporary “migration” or “refugee crisis” – or, rather, the unprec-
edented and disruptive force of disobedient human subjectivities appropriat-
ing mobility toward and across Europe and claiming space within Europe – has 
instigated a crisis of representation by juxtaposing these supposedly magnan-
imous “European values” with the truly violent and callous European border 
realities. The (temporary, but repeated) resurrection of nation-state borders by 
several member states since the summer of 2015 has starkly manifested the 
frailty of European unity and “solidarity” in haphazard attempts to regain at 
least the semblance of control. While Europe’s border work  – and especially 
its (flagrantly “un-European”) violence – have been and continue to be exter-
nalized and outsourced to “third countries” or peripheral member states, the 
unsettling and determined movements of hundreds of thousands of refugees 
and migrants through the Balkan routes into central and northern European 
countries have provoked humanitarian / securitarian “emergencies” across 
the continent. Images of countless thousands of “unauthorized” (and frankly 
unwelcome) travelers relentlessly menaced by European border enforcement 
authorities, beaten and gassed by riot police or soldiers, have circulated around 
the globe. Likewise, Europe’s maritime border policing, which has converted 
the Central Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea in particular into gruesome 
scenes of mass death, have repeatedly exposed a border regime truly predicated 
upon atrocity, by both omission and commission. That these horrific specta-
cles of desperation and death are predominated by the evident and plainly cruel 
disposability of lives and bodies racialized as non-white – and thus, “non-Eu-
ropean” – only seems to abundantly re-confirm that the project of “European” 
integration has in fact been dedicated all along to the re-institutionalization 
of what Étienne Balibar (1999/2004:43–45) anticipated to be a “European 
apartheid.”
 While the EU-ropean project is substantially new and unprecedented in sig-
nificant ways, the deeper historical roots of its infrastructure of expressly “Euro-
pean” apartheid remind us that apartheid was always indeed a truly European 
value, a special variant of a world economic, geo-political, and racial order of 
European colonialism that has profoundly shaped the brutal contours of con-
temporary global inequalities of wealth, power, and prestige. In this regard, it 
is precisely from the critical vantage point made possible by migration and bor-
ders that we may incisively discern the extent to which the self-styled “European 
values” of dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law, rights, justice, sol-
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idarity, and peace have always been postulated, in fact, as values “for Europeans 
only.”
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